RESOLUTION CONCERNING DETENTION AND EXPULSION
OF DANGEROUS AXIS NATIONALS

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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

I. The Problem

The Axis plans for political conquest of the American republics, as part of the totalitarian scheme for world domination, have only gradually been disclosed in all their magnitude. As these plans have been uncovered, the existence in this Hemisphere of a large and intricate network of subversive agents and organizations of the Axis powers, assiduously engaged in undermining the democratic institutions of the Continent has been vividly revealed.

To develop this network, the Axis powers made careful and intensive preparations for years in advance. An essential feature of these preparations contemplated the dispatch to this Hemisphere of a multitude of agents, trained in the techniques of totalitarian penetration, to operate under the close direction of the military and political officials and agencies of the Axis governments. The totalitarian countries, over a period of years antedating the present conflict, systematically assigned to the American republics a continuous stream of agents, oftentimes disguised as diplomats, business men, scientists, artists, immigrants, technicians, tourists, refugees, heads of cultural and religious missions, etc. Further to conceal the true nature of their mission, many of these treacherous visitors were instructed to and did acquire American nationality, as this Committee has had occasion to point out in its recommendations on Abuse of Nationality, approved on November 10, 1942.

These masked official emissaries proceeded to create new groups and organizations, and to infiltrate into existing ones, to serve as centers for the inculcation of totalitarian principles and techniques, the dissemination of steadily-increasing volumes of totalitarian propaganda, and the stimulation of domestic political dissenion and confusion. As Axis manipulation, support and control of these groups and organizations became more complete, they undertook the even more serious function of espionage, sabotage, and military operations.

In perfecting these schemes, full use was made of groups and colonies of Axis nationals earlier resident in this Hemisphere, considerable numbers of whose members, although by no means the majority, evidenced their primary allegiance to totalitarian principles and the Axis goal of world domination. In the Americas, as in Europe, these basic "fifth column" steps toward the Axis objective of undermining local governments, institutions, and democratic principles, reached a high stage of perfection.
The rupture of diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers by all but one of the American republics, following upon the Axis aggression in this Hemisphere, and the concomitant preventive and punitive measures which have been taken by these republics to overcome the totalitarian menace to their security, have delivered a substantial blow to these subversive plans and operations of the Axis. Nevertheless, it was necessary that the withdrawal of most of the Axis official diplomatic corps, and the internment or detention of a number of other equally dangerous Axis representatives, should be followed up by further, energetic measures of direct control in order fully and adequately to eliminate the Axis leaders and uproot their intricate subversive organization. Disclosures by this Committee of an Axis espionage ring which has its center in one American republic, but extends its tentacles into many others, which have either severed diplomatic relations or are at war with Axis powers, shows that the Axis network remains strong and active. Having made thorough preparations for all eventualities, the Axis has been able to evade many of the control measures adopted in this Hemisphere by transferring the better-known agents to neutral territory, by resorting to underground or camouflaged organizations, including other nationality groups identified with Axis ideology, and by other evasions.

In part, these secret changes have been made with the deliberate design of fostering the impression that Axis subversive activity has been abandoned or eliminated.

One of the gravest present dangers, therefore, is that of indulging in the wishful thinking deliberately sought to be assimilated by the Axis that, because of the effectuation of certain control measures, or various military successes of the United Nations, the Axis network in the Americas has ceased to constitute a serious danger to the security of the Hemisphere. The truth is that as the Axis military power further declines, increased vigilance must be employed to prevent the intensification within this Hemisphere of espionage, sabotage, and other destructive totalitarian activities. The Axis may be expected to fight more violently the nearer it approaches its doom.

It has been necessary for the American republics to institute, develop, and extend many preventive and punitive measures, such as programs regarding the registration and identification of aliens, control of their associations and organizations, scrutiny of their acquisition of citizenship, control of their travel and the strengthening of border controls, the severance and censorship of communications, and prevention of sabotage, in accordance with Resolution XVII of the Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Rio de Janeiro.

However, of all the steps that may be taken for the protection of the internal security of the Hemisphere, the internment of dangerous Axis agents and nationals is regarded by this Committee as one of the most necessary and efficacious. If the Axis saboteur, spy, or subversive propagandist in placed in internment or detention, the safety of the Hemisphere will be directly protected and will not be dependent upon the various preventive measures.
The promotion of the adoption and energetic execution of a program of detention to deprive all dangerous Axis agents and nationals of their liberty of movement and power to jeopardize the security of the Hemisphere is, therefore, the primary goal of the attached resolution and a main objective of the Committee's labors.

It is to be understood, as is made clear throughout the annexed resolution, that the term "Axis nationals" refers to nationals of the member states of the Tripartite Pact and of all states subservient thereto, wherever used in the resolution or in this explanatory statement.

II. Remedial Measures Now Prevailing

To date, the American republics have utilized a number of methods to reduce the danger which arises from the presence of dangerous Axis nationals or agents.

The repatriation of a considerable number of Axis nationals has been effected, both under general arrangements for the exchange of American official personnel abroad, and under special arrangements for the exchange or repatriation of private citizens.

The Committee understands that, upon the return of the officials of the American republics, accredited to the Vichy-French government but seized by the German government, and those to be exchanged between the Axis and the Republic of Chile, the general exchange of diplomatic officials between the Axis Powers and the American republics will have been substantially completed; thus the primary purpose of general repatriation is nearly attained. Programs for the detention of Axis agents and dangerous Axis nationals have been carried out by various of the American republics. Some of the countries have established detention camps in non-vital areas of the country where they are interred, under strict supervision. Certain of the republics have undertaken bi-lateral arrangements for the expulsion and transfer of dangerous Axis nationals, either individually or in groups, to other republics, in most cases for internment for the duration of the present war.

Other countries have restricted specified groups of actually or potentially dangerous individuals to certain defined areas or communities of enforced residence, where they are kept under general surveillance. The removal of Axis nationals from coastal areas has also been carried out.

III. Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee

1. The seriousness of the problem presented by the menacing activities of dangerous Axis agents and nationals within the Hemisphere, as has been pointed out above, is reflected in paragraph 1 of the attached resolution.

2. The first essential step for solution of this problem consists of the enactment of the necessary enabling laws and decrees, to the extent that existing legislation is not sufficient to permit achieving the ends
recommended. Paragraph 2 of the attached resolution refers to the necessity that such legislative authority, include authority to order the expulsion of any dangerous Axis national to another American republic for purposes of detention therein during the period of the emergency.

3. There are but two basic courses which may be followed in seeking to safeguard the security of the Hemisphere in this connection: (a) internment of Axis agents or dangerous Axis nationals for the duration of the emergency; (b) their repatriation. No measure which leaves such persons at liberty, even under surveillance, within this Hemisphere is sufficient to thwart their intentions and the possibility of their carrying on acts of espionage, sabotage, or subversive propaganda.

4. The Committee has given careful consideration to the respective advantages and disadvantages of the two possible methods of control mentioned above, and has concluded that internment is greatly to be preferred to repatriation and should be pursued as the basic security policy respecting dangerous Axis agents and nationals.

Any repatriation program necessarily results in the return to the Axis countries of considerable numbers of persons who are well-informed concerning vital military, political, and economic developments in the Hemisphere, or who are trained in or suitable for military or other necessary war service. Such persons would be of great value to the Axis powers. This is perfectly obvious as to such persons as paid Axis agents, leaders in subversive organizations, spies, or persons with military or scientific training. Furthermore, according to information in the possession of the Committee, German nationals recently repatriated to Germany have continued to disseminate subversive propaganda to their associates and acquaintances in this Hemisphere, by means of short-wave radio.

Nor should it be forgotten that the Axis powers, and particularly Germany, are now facing a serious shortage in the manpower required in their war production operations. That this problem is regarded as critical has been openly revealed, not only by the public declarations of Axis leaders, exhorting their citizens to redouble their labors in war factories and industries, but also by the barbaric tactics of the Nazi conquerors in transporting millions of citizens of subjugated countries for forced labor in Germany.

Repatriation as a general policy, while it does remove dangerous Axis nationals physically from the American scene, does not thereby achieve the security objective sought. On the contrary, it might, if extensively applied, ultimately do more to impair American security than if the such nationals were to remain relatively unrestrained in the American republics of their present residence.

There is, however, one general and one special exception to the basic policy, now generally recognized by the American republics, against repatriation of Axis nationals.
The general exception consists of the recognized practice of exchanging official personnel upon a severance of diplomatic relations or a declaration of a state of war. Repatriation for this purpose is, however, now nearing the point of substantial completion.

The second exception consists of repatriating or exchanging non-official nationals. The Committee wishes to urge with great emphasis that this exception, for which there is little precedent, must be carefully restricted. Where Axis nationals having a past or potential quality of dangerousness are concerned (and it is these which the Axis most desires to obtain), the grave and well-known danger in permitting their repatriation -- that they will be of military or political value to the Axis powers upon their return -- must always be borne uppermost in mind.

As against these important considerations the Committee has given due consideration to the fact that a number of private citizens of the American republics still remain in Axis or Axis-dominated territory. It is clear to the Committee, however, that the understandable desire of some republics to assist some of these persons to return to their native countries does not justify a general program of exchange.

Bearing in mind the value received by the Axis powers from the return of their informed, trained, or able-bodied nationals, and the concomitant threat to American security, the crucial question is whether the return of any non-official American nationals still in territory under Axis control is required by security considerations of equal or greater weight. Obviously, no general answer can be given to this question so far as the American nationals remaining abroad are concerned. Many of them resided or were in Axis territory for reasons having no relation to the present conflict; their return to American territory would in no significant sense contribute to the welfare of their native land or the security of the Hemisphere in the present emergency. The solution can be reached only upon careful examination of the individual cases involved in any proposed exchange, both of the Axis nationals and the American nationals. This examination would decide whether the security risks inherent in loss of control over the non-official Axis nationals are outweighed by the advantages resulting from the return of the American nationals involved.

The Committee, therefore, believes that the American republics should not pursue any general program for the repatriation of citizens, but, on the contrary, should limit that exchange to special cases to be carefully determined in accord with the foregoing principles. And, as is implicit in the foregoing, no Axis national having a real or potential quality of dangerousness or substantial quality of usefulness to the Axis war effort should be permitted to be repatriated, except upon an exchange basis.

The foregoing conclusions are reflected in paragraphs five and six of the attached resolution.
It would not be inconsistent with the foregoing conclusions to permit the repatriation of those persons whose return raises no security question. Such persons, however, are shown by experience to be composed almost exclusively of young children, the aged and those who are incapacitated by persistent illness or infirmity from performing useful work or service.

5. From the conclusions stated above there follow naturally the Committee's main recommendation concerning detention, embodied in paragraph 3 of the attached resolution. The substance of that recommendation is that the American republics should intensify the practice of placing all dangerous Axis nationals in detention for the duration of the present conflict.

Paragraph 3 states the two courses feasible to achieve detention within this Hemisphere. While the Committee believes that there is room for improvement in carrying forward internment programs in each of the republics, it frankly recognizes that by reason of lack of facilities or similar reasons arising out of local conditions some of the republics may not find themselves in a position to embark as fully upon a program for local detention as they would desire in the interests of fully safeguarding Hemisphere security. Accordingly, paragraph 3 urges local detention within each republic, and a complementary program of expulsion for detention in another American republic for the duration of the emergency.

The Committee is informed that these two procedures have been and are continuing to be followed by various of the American republics. In urging their continuance, the Committee desires to emphasize that it is of equal importance and interest to all the countries of the Hemisphere that no dangerous Axis agent or national in any country be permitted to continue his subversive activities. It is thus unimportant from the point of view of security whether such persons are detained in the country in which they happen to reside or in another American republic whose geographical or other facilities are more readily available or afford more effective control. Both solutions are to be regarded as equally desirable.

While it is recognized that in some of the republics additional legislative power may have to be obtained in order fully to carry out the recommended programs of detention, either locally or in another republic, certain existing powers of expulsion and deportation may be applicable in some instances to achieve these purposes.

With regard to the power of expulsion of dangerous persons, it should be emphasized, however, that the present emergency necessitates more than a mere exercise of this power, where that course, as distinguished from detention locally, is determined appropriate. Expulsion of Axis agents and dangerous Axis nationals would leave them completely free to jeopardize the security of the Hemisphere in another republic, since normally any person subjected to expulsion has been accorded the right to select the country
of destination. To permit such a choice in the present emergency would be to tolerate the transfer to a sister republic of the dangers which led to the expulsion but which such expulsion does not remedy. Because the menace involved affects all the American republics, it is plain that they must couple the exercise of their expulsion power with arrangements for detention, eliminating any privilege in the person expelled to select his destination. With that privilege eliminated, the existing power of expulsion in many American countries could be the normal applicable method to achieve detention in other American republics.

There exists, in addition, in certain republics, a power of deportation, that is, of directing the return of an individual to his country of origin, which in some instances may also be applicable to achieve detention, either locally or in another republic. It is the common practice to retain persons ordered deported in detention during the period between the order and the date of actual deportation. Since actual deportation during the emergency would not only be practically impossible but also contrary to security principles, the result reached is equivalent to the exercise of a direct power of detention.

Or, the person may be transferred to another republic for detention pending deportation, in which case it is equivalent to the exercise of the power of expulsion as recommended in this resolution.

Finally, in giving effect to their powers of detention and expulsion, the American republics, including those not at war with the Axis, have wisely concluded that the Axis should not be permitted to take advantage of democratic respect for traditional international concepts in order to continue their reprehensible activities in this Hemisphere --- utilizing for their protection the guarantees of that very democracy which they are seeking to destroy. The republics are deeply conscious that the subjugated democracies of Europe bear tragic witness to the futility of affording democratic liberties to the agents of the Axis, in other words, of relying upon the Axis to observe the customary precepts governing international affairs. These precepts the Axis powers have uniformly disregarded, indeed, openly scorned. The determination of the American republics not to be misled, but jointly to adopt measures for their mutual protection despite the absence of a state of belligerency in some of them, is nowhere more compellingly justified and demanded than in the matter of cooperating for the detention of the enemies remaining at relative freedom in their very midst.

Nor should the American republics allow themselves to be deterred from continuing and expanding these detention procedures by reason of Axis or Axis-inspired threats or rumors that American nationals abroad will be mistreated.

To forestall any pretext of justification for any such threat, the American republics would do well to utilize, as a general guide to appropriate standards for the detention
of Axis agents and dangerous Axis nationals, the principles agreed to in the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. That Convention, of course, is not strictly applicable since it relates only to prisoners of war; nevertheless, in various respects the standards contained therein refer to aspects of detention which are closely analogous and are, therefore, convenient guides to follow, as recommended in paragraph 3 of the annexed resolution. For this reason, many of the belligerents in the present war have agreed to conform to its standards with reference to civilian detention. Any Axis threats to mistreat American nationals under their jurisdiction, despite the application of such principles on the part of the American republics, can carry little weight in view of the overwhelmingly superior position of the American republics, within whose borders there remain a total of Axis nationals which is far in excess of the relatively small numbers of American nationals remaining in Axis or Axis-dominated areas. The American republics thus have it within their power to insure the appropriate treatment of their nationals abroad.

6. In paragraph 7 of the attached resolution the Committee urges upon the governments maximum utilization of the processes of consultation and collaboration among each other in the adoption and execution of their programs and policies regarding detention and repatriation.

The desirability of such concerted action is obvious in view of the fact that Axis subversive individuals, groups, and activities constitute a Hemisphere problem, as Resolution XVII at the Third Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs so clearly declares. Their presence in any one republic is a threat to all others; indeed, one republic may be but the convenient refuge— a base of operations— for the continuance of attacks upon the security of others, as recent events have shown. Hence, it is clear that in order effectively to meet a common danger the efforts of all the republics must be as uniform and coordinated as possible; the processes of regular consultation and collaboration, developed by the American republics to such a high degree of effectiveness, are the means to this end.

Moreover, the American republics are able to exert a bargaining power in negotiations with respect to repatriation or exchange, when they act in concert, which is sufficient to enable them to reject unjust proposals of the Axis powers. The Committee is informed that such demands or proposals have recently been submitted, including an insistence upon the inclusion of large numbers of non-official personnel among those to be exchanged for the officials of the American republics which Germany, in violation of settled principles, recently seized at Vichy. In other instances, the Axis states have submitted demands for the non-official personnel numbering far in excess of the American nationals whom they proposed to return in exchange. In these connections, there has been understandable concern upon the part of the individual American republics involved with respect to the safety and proper treatment of their nationals, in view of the long record of extortion and threats which has marked the conduct of international affairs by the Axis powers. By full consultation and joint
action in each of these respects, it is patent that the
American republics have the power to avoid acceptance of
excessive proposals and are in a superior position to pro-
cure the return of those small numbers of their nationals
whose repatriation from Axis territory is determined to be
necessary.

In substance, therefore, the Committee urges in this
connection that the American republics regard the American
nationals held by the Axis, and the Axis nationals within
this Hemisphere, as common pools of Hemisphere interest,
not as separate groups of national interest. Here, as in
other instances, the Axis policy of "Divide and Conquer"
can be completely frustrated by the American policy of co-
operation and unity.

7. In paragraph 8 of the annexed resolution, the
Committee refers to particular subjects regarding which
full collaboration, consultation, and exchange of informa-
tion, are highly desirable.

The first of these (sub-paragraph a) relates to all
proposals made by or in behalf of the Axis states, or states
subservient to them, with respect to the repatriation or
exchange of nationals of such states. Various reasons why
full consultation should prevail regarding such proposals
have already been discussed above.

The second item (sub-paragraph b) relates to the partic-
ular Axis nationals involved in any proposed repatriation
or exchange. The basic foundation of this recommendation
is the necessity for obtaining all information bearing upon
the question whether such persons may be released for re-
patriation, consistently with the necessary security stan-
dards, and for assuring that such information is jointly
considered among the republics most concerned or affected.

This Committee is informed that procedures for the ex-
change and joint consideration of such information prevail
among the American republics, and urges their further de-
velopment and expansion.

In addition to its general value in assisting in the
attainment of that uniformity of standards and procedures
which was recommended by the Third Meeting of the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs in Resolution XVII, the recommendation
for further collaboration, consultation, and exchange of
information concerning the standards, criteria, and proced-
ures employed in the execution of detention programs (set
forth in sub-paragraph a) is especially desirable in con-
nection with programs and arrangements for the expulsion
of the Axis nationals for detention elsewhere in the Hemi-
sphere.

8. The recommendations made by the Committee are di-
rected mainly at the establishment of the substantive prin-
ciples which, in the judgment of the Committee, should form
the basis policies most desirable for the American repub-
lics to pursue. In order, however, that the Committee may
give further consideration to the detailed methods and pro-
cedures by which these policies may, in their execution,
be more fully coordinated, the Committee asks for further information from all the republics. This information includes the legislative and administrative provisions existing in the various republics (sub-paragraph a), the standards and procedures they employ in applying and enforcing their controls (b), and their views and suggestions concerning methods of achieving increased collaboration and unified action on bilateral and multilateral lines (c).

Although the information concerning each one of these points would be of the greatest utility, special importance is attached to the description of the standards and procedures the republics employ in the application of their regulations regarding detention of Axis nationals. Since this is the crucial control measure required by the circumstances which confront the Hemisphere, it is in regard to the uniformity of these standards and procedures that the Committee feels it may be able to render particular further service in the discharge of its coordinating responsibilities.

9. Pending the receipt of such further information the Committee, however, submits the following preliminary suggestions, which it believes applicable in any event to the operation of detention and related controls over the person of Axis nationals.

a. Investigation. The fundamental basis of a successful program of detention and individual control of Axis nationals is a careful and thorough investigation by the appropriate authorities. No Axis nationals whose activities menace the defense of the Hemisphere should be permitted to escape discovery. It is of only slightly lesser importance, on the other hand, that Axis nationals who are opposed to the Axis and are loyal to the cause of the democracies not be made to suffer through insufficient investigation. Such a result would not accord with the liberal democratic tradition of the Americas, and, moreover, would tend to create dissatisfaction among otherwise loyal minority groups within the Hemisphere.

b. Apprehension and determination of treatment. The initial apprehension of dangerous Axis nationals, based upon the facts uncovered by prior investigation, should be kept as far as possible under centralized control. A determination should be made by the competent authorities in each case whether the individual should be detained in custody for the duration of the emergency. Although the Committee recommends no specific procedure for this important step in the program, it is evident that the authorities will have to consider all the facts disclosed by the investigation, including such evidence from the individual involved as may be warranted, and thereupon make an evaluation of the case and a determination of the treatment to be accorded the individual. In making these procedural suggestions the Committee wishes to point out that the problem is one of balancing the desirability of a fair determination with the necessity of expedition in the interests of Hemisphere security.

c. The standard of dangerousness. As stated in paragraph 4 of the annexed resolution, the general standard of dangerousness is the predisposition of the Axis national involved to render aid to the Axis in the present world conflict, if an opportunity to do so were to present itself.
Particularized criteria are included for assistance in applying this general principle.

This principle leads to an objective decision based upon an examination of the past or present associations of the individual in groups or organizations controlled or operated by the Axis, the dissemination of Axis propaganda and, generally, any other conduct which indicates an intention to prejudice the security and defense of any American republic in aid of any member state of the Tripartite Pact.

It is necessary to bear in mind that the basis of the standard is Hemisphere security. Accordingly, it is of no moment that the associations or conduct involved are not directed, or appear not directed, specifically against the sovereignty, independence, institutions, or security of the particular American republic where the Axis national is found. Axis agents, while residing in one country are engaged in activities which menace the security of other nations of the Hemisphere, and the interests of all require that such persons be interned.

d. Internment. Those Axis nationals whose continued liberty is found to be dangerous to the security of the Hemisphere should be interned for the duration of the present conflict in special detention camps established by the government in interior portions of the country which are removed from vital areas and which offer the most appropriate facilities; or be detained in custody pending expulsion to another American republic for such detention, as the case may be.

10. Other Controls. Finally, it is to be emphasized that the controls presently recommended are in addition to the general restrictive and preventive measures to be applied to Axis nationals, such as registration, surveillance and periodic reporting, restrictions upon entry and exit, denial or withdrawal of citizenship, protection against sabotage by removal to specified non-vital areas of enforced residence, prohibition against employment in vital industries, and other like controls described in Resolution XVII with respect to which this Committee has previously adopted detailed recommended programs. Rigid enforcement of such measures will assist enforcement of the program recommended herein.

This is particularly true of the Committee's recommendations on "Abuse of Nationality", adopted under date of November 10, 1942. In the explanatory statement accompanying that resolution the Committee pointed to the practices by which dangerous Axis nationals fraudulently acquired American nationality in order to cloak their activities and to take advantage of the protections commonly afforded to American nationals. In the resolution the Committee proposed standards and procedures for the cancellation of the American nationality of all such persons. Various instances have come to the attention of the Committee in which, under cover of their recently and falsely-acquired American citizenship, dangerous Axis agents were able thereby to evade detention or like appropriate control. The American republics must continue their efforts to nullify these tactics by terminating the citizenship status of all such persons.
RESOLUTION CONCERNING
DETENTION AND EXPULSION OF DANGEROUS AXIS NATIONALS

WHEREAS,

A. The Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American republics recommended in Resolution XVII and in the attachement thereto that the American republics take comprehensive regulatory measures to control dangerous aliens by establishing procedures whereby all nationals of member states of the Tripartite Pact and states subservient to them "as are deemed dangerous to the country of their residence shall during their stay therein remain in detention or be restricted in their freedom of movement";

B. The Axis states have for many years sent to the nations of the Western Hemisphere thousands of political agents for the conduct of totalitarian political warfare as an integral part of the Axis scheme to achieve world domination;

C. These Axis political emissaries, commonly disguised as diplomats, immigrants, business men, scientists, artists, tourists, cultural and religious representatives, refugees, and the like, were instructed to and did establish throughout the nations of this Hemisphere a tremendous network of leaders, groups, and organizations for the spread of totalitarian propaganda and the conduct of other subversive activities for the purpose of carrying out the political and military conquest of this Hemisphere;

D. Considerable numbers of such nationals continue to enjoy excessive freedom, despite the promulgation by many of the American republics of regulations intended to restrict their freedom or otherwise thwart their hostile activities, with the result that these individuals continue to menace the security of all these republics by control, manipulation, and support of cloaked or secret totalitarian groups and organizations engaged in sabotage of vital facilities and materials, in espionage, in the stimulation of totalitarian propaganda, in the fostering of political dissension and disunity in the American republics, and in manifold other activities designed to serve the political warfare ends of the Axis;

E. It is imperative that the American republics recognize the continuing grave menace to their security presented by these individuals and that they adopt drastic methods to deprive all of them of their power, through their continued personal freedom, to jeopardize the war and defense efforts of the American republics and their unity and solidarity in opposition to the Axis;

F. There are two main courses which might be pursued in regard to these dangerous nationals of member states of the Tripartite Pact and states subservient thereto:

a) Detention within this Hemisphere;

b) Repatriation;
G. In the above-mentioned Resolution XVII, the Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs charged the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense with the responsibility to study and coordinate the measures recommended in said Resolution;

THE EMERGENCY ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR POLITICAL DEFENSE

RESOLVES,

1. To advise the governments of the American republics that considerable numbers of dangerous nationals of member states of the Tripartite Pact and states subservient thereto continue to enjoy excessive liberty of action within the Western Hemisphere;

2. To recommend to the governments of the American republics that, to the extent that they have not already done so, they immediately enact adequate measures to restrict the liberty of all nationals of member states of the Tripartite Pact and states subservient thereto deemed to be dangerous by detention and by related direct controls over their liberty and freedom of movement, including the power to expel or deport such nationals to another specified American republic for detention or like control therein;

3. To recommend to the governments of the American republics that they immediately institute a comprehensive and vigil ant program for the continuous detention, for the duration of the present emergency, of all dangerous nationals of member states of the Tripartite Pact and states subservient thereto found within their jurisdictions, utilizing either or both of the following two methods;

   a) Detention in their own territory in well-guarded detention camps or communities to the extent that facilities thereof exist or may readily be prepared;

   b) Expulsion or deportation, under prior arrangements therefor, to another American republic for like detention, where such action appears necessary or desirable because of the facilities existing in said republic, following, as a general guide, the analogous principles and standards concerning detention contained in the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, relative to the treatment of prisoners of war;

4. To recommend to the governments of the American republics that, generally, any national of a member state of the Tripartite Pact or state subservient thereto who, by his conduct, past or present, indicates a predisposition to aid a member state of the Tripartite Pact should, within the meaning of paragraph 3 above, be regarded as dangerous, and should, for the duration of the emergency, be interned; and that any of the following types of conduct should be regarded as strongly persuasive indication of such a predisposition:

   a) Active participation as a member, or active support to, any organization or group which is acting in the interest of a member state of the Tripartite Pact or a state subservient thereto;
b) Conduct giving reasonable grounds to believe that the person has engaged or is likely to engage in the unauthorized transmission or collection of vital information related to the defense of any American republic or of the Hemisphere;

c) Conduct which gives reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed or is likely to commit, in aid of any member state of the Tripartite Pact, any acts of destruction or sabotage of facilities or materials vital to the security and defense of any American republic or of the Hemisphere;

d) Conduct giving reasonable grounds to believe that the person has disseminated pro-Axis propaganda or has in any other manner incited or encouraged others to act on behalf of or in the interests of a member state of the Tripartite Pact or state subservient thereto;

e) Any other conduct which indicates an intention to prejudice the security and defense of any American republic in aid of any member state of the Tripartite Pact;

f) Adherence to or pronounced sympathy for the totalitarian political ideology;

5. To emphasize to the governments of the American republics that a general policy of repatriation of nationals of member states of the Tripartite Pact and states subservient thereto is contrary to the interests of Hemisphere security, because it would provide the Axis governments with well-informed and well-trained agents and other useful personnel of great value to the Axis in the further conduct of their military and political warfare both within and without this Hemisphere;

6. To recommend to the governments of the American republics that repatriation of dangerous nationals of member states of the Tripartite Pact or states subservient thereto should be permitted only upon an exchange basis and should be limited to

a) Persons having diplomatic or other official governmental status entitled to exchange under-recognized principles governing the repatriation of official personnel upon a severance of diplomatic relations;

b) Such other Axis nationals, strictly limited in number, as it may be necessary to repatriate in exchange for nationals of the American republics, detained in Axis or Axis-dominated territory, whose return to this Hemisphere is believed desirable in the interests of its security or for like special and compelling reasons;

7. To recommend to the governments of the American republics that, since the problem is of Hemisphere as well as of national concern, and since the American republics, acting in concert, enjoy a position of advantage over the member states of the Tripartite Pact which enables them to reject excessive repatriation, exchange, or related demands made by such member states, the governments of the American republics should consult and collaborate together
closely and continuously in the adoption and execution of
their programs regarding expulsion, detention, repatria-
tion or exchange of Axis nationals.

8. To recommend to the governments of the American
republics that, without intending to limit the area of bi-
lateral and multilateral consultation and collaboration
recommended in the preceding paragraph, they consult, col-
laborate and exchange information concerning the following:

a) Proposals made by or on behalf of any member state
of the Tripartite Pact, or state subservient thereto, re-
garding the repatriation or exchange of nationals thereof;

b) The Axis nationals requested, proposed, or other-
wise under consideration for repatriation or exchange,
including all information relevant to their actual or po-
tential dangerousness to the security of the Hemisphere,
their ability to contribute to the war effort of any mem-
ber state of the Tripartite Pact or state subservient
thereto, and any other factors relevant to the question
whether their repatriation or exchange would be consonant
with the security principles recommended herein;

c) The standards and procedures employed in determin-
ing what individuals are sufficiently dangerous to warrant
their detention.

9. To request the governments of the American republics
that, in order to strengthen and develop programs, procedures
and uniform standards, they advise this Committee concerning
the following:

a) Their legislative and administrative provisions
and practices applicable to the expulsion, detention,
repatriation and like control of nationals of member states
of the Tripartite Pact and states subservient thereto;

b) The standards and procedures they employ in the
selection of nationals of member states of the Tripartite
Pact and states subservient thereto for expulsion, detention,
repatriation or the application of similar controls.

c) Their views and suggestions concerning methods
for achieving full and active cooperation among the
American republics in the application of such control
measures, including the feasibility and desirability of
multilateral programs for the detention of dangerous na-
tionals of member states of the Tripartite Pact and states
subservient thereto at points appropriately situated in
the Hemisphere, under the common control, administration,
and support of the participating governments.