

NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION

REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEVENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

H. Res. 113

A RESOLUTION TO INQUIRE FURTHER INTO THE INTER-
STATE MIGRATION OF CITIZENS, EMPHASIZING
THE PRESENT AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE MIGRATION
CAUSED BY THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE PROGRAM

**Preliminary Report and Recommendations on
Problems of Evacuation of Citizens and
Aliens From Military Areas**

MARCH 19, 1942



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MIGRATION**

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NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION

MARCH 19, 1942.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. SPARKMAN, from the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, submitted the following

PRELIMINARY REPORT

[Pursuant to H. Res. 113, 77th Cong., 1st sess.]

INTRODUCTION

In the following brief preliminary report this committee presents to Congress its findings and recommendations with respect to the problems of evacuation of the military zones on the west coast established by the Executive order of the President of February 19. These findings and recommendations are made as the result of a survey made by the five members of this committee in the three Pacific Coast States. The committee is planning a final comprehensive report on this subject at an early date.

This preliminary report is divided as follows: The events from December 7 until the appearance of this report are organized in a section which presents chronologically statements and actions of Members of Congress, and of the military and civilian agencies charged with responsibility for evacuation. The remainder of the report is divided into a discussion, first, of the evacuation of the Japanese and, second, of the evacuation of the Italian and German aliens. The section on the Japanese is, in turn, divided into "Statistics on Japanese citizens and aliens"; "Evacuation policy"; "Resettlement: Americanization or deportation"; "Property custodianship, reception centers, Federal assistance." The section dealing with the Germans and Italians includes a discussion of the number and distribution of German and Italian aliens on the west coast and throughout the country, and the evacuation of Italian and German aliens from areas in the Western Defense Command.

With the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, as the Nation's anger rose against the Japanese, those of Japanese origin residing in the United States were also the object of some resentment. Within a few days, moreover, the formal declarations of a state of war with the

NOTE.—On March 18, 1942, the President of the United States issued an order establishing in the Office for Emergency Management the War Relocation Authority and defining its functions and duties. The text of this Executive order is reprinted in full at the end of this report; see appendix C, page 32.

Axis Powers created a class of persons known as enemy aliens. For at least a month thereafter, however, the temper of the American people remained relatively calm toward these groups in their midst.

Meanwhile the Federal Bureau of Investigation was active in rounding up those enemy aliens (German, Italian, and Japanese) considered most immediately dangerous. These raids were made with the aid of information supplied by the military and naval intelligence services, and often with the collaboration of local police officials. Editorial comment praised these preventive measures, and there appeared no widespread demand for wholesale evacuation.

Following the appearance of the Roberts report on January 25, the public temper changed noticeably.¹ By the end of January, a considerable press demand appeared for evacuation of aliens, and especially of the Japanese from the west coast. On January 29, Attorney General Biddle announced the creation of certain limited military areas in the three coast States from which all enemy aliens were to be evacuated by February 24. A few hundred living in especially vulnerable areas were to be evacuated on February 15. To supervise these evacuations, a Coordinator of Enemy Alien Problems, Mr. Tom C. Clark, was appointed by the Attorney General.

This announcement was followed by an increase in newspaper stories and press comments. The order called for evacuation of limited areas and affected less than 10,000 persons along the entire coast. Most of the evacuees moved only short distances, usually doubling up with relatives in other parts of the city or in nearby places. An assistance fund of \$500,000 was earmarked by the Federal Security Agency, but only a very small part of it drawn upon for hardship cases arising from this move.

On Monday, February 2, a meeting of the entire west coast congressional delegation was held in the office of Senator Hiram Johnson of California, and as a result two committees were appointed by Senator Johnson. One of these, headed by Senator Rufus C. Holman, of Oregon, was to consider immediate plans for an impregnable defense of the Pacific coast. The other, headed by Senator Mon C. Wallgren, of Washington, was to deal with the question of enemy alien and sabotage control in the same area.

¹ One of the factors making for public antagonism toward persons of Japanese origin in the continental United States was the widespread reports in magazines and newspapers of instances of sabotage for which Japanese residents of Hawaii were allegedly responsible on December 7. The Roberts report does not make any statements with respect to such sabotage but only with regard to espionage. This committee is in receipt of telegrams from the Delegate representing the Territory of Hawaii in Congress, the Honorable Samuel W. King, and also from the chief of police of Honolulu. These telegrams appear in appendix B, p. 32. Both of them deny the reports of such sabotage. Because of these conflicting reports, this committee has requested the War and Navy Departments and the Department of Justice to inform us as to the true facts in this regard. The problems represented by the evacuation of the Japanese on the west coast involve approximately 1 percent of the population of the 3 Pacific Coast States. The total population of Hawaii at the 1940 Census numbered 423,330 of which 157,905, or 37 percent, were Japanese. Of this number, 37,353, or 23.6 percent, were Japanese aliens. It is clear from these figures that, whereas the movement of Japanese from the coastal areas on the mainland presents many problems, these in no way compare in magnitude with the difficulties which would be involved if it were seriously proposed to evacuate the Japanese from the Hawaiian Islands.

We wish to point out here that the committee heard testimony from Attorney General Earl Warren, of California, and others, urging that whereas there had been no sabotage on the west coast to their knowledge up to the time of their testimony, they believed that this constituted no guarantee against such sabotage in the future. Attorney General Warren went on to say: "Unfortunately, however, many of our people and some of our authorities and, I am afraid, many of our people in other parts of the country are of the opinion that because we have no sabotage and no fifth-column activities in this State since the beginning of the war that, perhaps, that means that none have been planned for us. But I take the view that that is the most ominous sign in our whole situation. It convinces me more than perhaps any other factor that the sabotage that we are to get, the fifth-column activities that we are to get, are timed just like Pearl Harbor was timed and just like the invasion of France and of Denmark and of Norway and all of those other countries."

On February 13, 1942, the following letter and attached recommendations were sent to President Roosevelt by the Pacific coast delegation. These recommendations eventuated in the President's Executive order of February 19.

FEBRUARY 13, 1942.

HON. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
President of the United States,
White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: By direction of the Members of Congress from the Pacific Coast States of California, Oregon, and Washington, we submit herewith the recommendations which were unanimously adopted by the members of the Pacific coast delegation present at a meeting held this morning.

Realizing the seriousness of the Japanese menace along the entire Pacific coast, the Members of Congress from that area have responded to the insistent demands for prompt action in handling this problem by holding several meetings at which the entire matter was thoroughly discussed with the Attorney General and members of his staff, as well as representatives of the War and other departments of the Government. To arrive at a satisfactory solution of the problem of handling not enemy aliens alone, but also disloyal and subversive citizens as well, has not been easy. However, we believe that the program suggested in these recommendations will effectively accomplish our purpose to safeguard the welfare and security of our people and the Pacific coast area.

Eliminating the question of citizenship and basing our procedure upon the question of loyalty alone, we feel that an effective means of reaching our potential enemies can be attained. By utilizing the military authority of the Army to effect the partial or complete evacuation of strategic areas, to be determined in size, scope, and location by the military authority, we feel that the Army or the Department of Justice may rightfully remove any or all persons whom they may select from such areas and prohibit their return. This might require the principles of martial law, it might inconvenience to greater or lesser extent many loyal and patriotic citizens, but we feel the critical nature of the situation and its latent subversive potentialities are so compelling as to justify the taking of extreme and drastic measures.

We are of the opinion that a complete program calling for the evacuation, removal, resettlement, and rehabilitation of undesirable persons can be effectively carried out without delay provided the various agencies of the Government will immediately cooperate in the utilization of all available facilities at their disposal, and realizing as do we, the seriousness of the present situation, if they will devote a competent staff to the exclusive work of developing a full solution of the problem.

We therefore urge, Mr. President, that you initiate the steps necessary to accomplish the purpose of these recommendations by calling upon such agencies of the Government as are able and capable of aiding in this program and directing them to utilize such facilities as are available to them in order that our ends may be attained and the people of the Pacific coast as well as of the entire Nation may be assured that no steps looking to the safety and security of this Nation from attack from within has been overlooked.

By direction of the Pacific coast delegation we submit herewith the recommendations adopted this morning.

Very sincerely yours,

RUFUS B. HOLMAN.
MON C. WALLGREN.
CLARENCE LEA.
HARRY ENGLEBRIGHT.
RICHARD WELCH.
JOHN M. COSTELLO.
HOMER D. ANGELL

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PACIFIC COAST DELEGATION REGARDING ALIEN ENEMIES AND SABOTAGE

We recommend the immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage and all others, aliens and citizens alike, whose presence shall be deemed dangerous or inimical to the defense of the United States, from all strategic areas.

In defining said strategic areas we recommend that such areas include all military installations, war industries, water and power-plant installations, oil fields and refineries, transportation and other essential facilities, as well as adequate protective areas adjacent thereto.

We further recommend that such areas be enlarged as expeditiously as possible until they shall encompass the entire strategic area of the States of California, Oregon, and Washington, and the Territory of Alaska.

We make these recommendations in order that no citizen, located in a strategic area, may cloak his disloyal or subversive activity under the mantle of his citizenship alone and further to guarantee protection to all loyal persons, alien and citizen alike, whose safety may be endangered by some wanton act of sabotage.

After the letter of the west coast delegation went to the President, representations were made to the Select House Committee on National Defense Migration that an immediate survey of the current situation on the Pacific coast seemed desirable to the several Federal agencies charged with handling the evacuations including the War and Navy Departments, the Federal Security Agency, and the Departments of Agriculture and Justice. The committee's mandate from Congress as the Select Committee to Investigate National Defense Migration and its previous hearing experience were thought to make it the proper body for such a quick survey. It was believed that it would be valuable to have public hearings begin before the evacuation of the 24th, so that local communities could voice their attitudes toward the developing problem. The several Federal agencies pledged their cooperation.

Hearings opened in San Francisco on Saturday, February 21. That afternoon the committee met Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt at the Presidio for an executive session. The Coordinator for Enemy Alien Control, Tom C. Clark, testified on Monday, February 23.

Subsequent hearings were held in Portland on February 26, Seattle on February 28 and March 2, and in Los Angeles on March 6 and 7. Three members of the committee returned to San Francisco for a conference with the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, on Monday, March 9. At the request of the Coordinator, Tom C. Clark, who spoke as the representative of General DeWitt, we have designated two members of the committee's staff to remain on the coast to observe the progress of the evacuation program.

Throughout this series of hearings the committee took testimony from all interested groups who signified a desire to be heard and from public officials, Federal, State, and local, who were qualified to throw light on problems connected with evacuation. Approximately 150 witnesses were heard.² This extensive testimony will be organized topically and summarized in the final report on this subject which your committee hopes to present by April 7. In this preliminary report we present the highlights of our findings together with our immediate recommendations.

On February 19, the publication day of the President's Executive order, the chairman of this committee, in a press interview, pointed out the parallels between the order and the recommendations pre-

² Among these witnesses were Gov. Culbert L. Olson of California and Gov. Arthur B. Langlie of Washington; Mayors Angelo J. Rossi of San Francisco, R. Earl Riley of Portland, Earl Millikin of Seattle, Harry P. Cain of Tacoma, and Fletcher Bowron of Los Angeles; also, the mayors, city managers, and police chiefs. Mayor Rossi of San Francisco was accompanied by a panel which included Police Chief Charles W. Dullea, Mr. Florence M. McAuliffe, chief of the Morale Service of the San Francisco Civilian Defense Council, and Mr. Leland Cutler, chairman of the Subcommittee of the Morale Service on Racial and National Problems in San Francisco. Attorney General Warren of California also appeared in San Francisco. Testimony was also taken from the California Joint Immigration Committee, American Legion of the State of California, the State Federation of Labor, the Native Sons of the Golden West, and the California State Grange. In all four hearings the committee took testimony from authorized representatives of the Japanese-American Citizens League and other groups representing the Japanese, the German, and Italian communities, groups and individuals representing the Catholic Church and various Protestant churches.

viously made to the President by the Pacific coast delegation. The order follows:

EXECUTIVE ORDER

AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY AREAS

WHEREAS the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national defense material, national defense premises, and national defense utilities as defined in section 4, act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220, and the act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (U. S. C., title 50, sec. 104):

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the military commanders who he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate military commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said military commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of military areas in any region or locality shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General under the proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas.

I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said military commanders to take such other steps as he or the appropriate military commander may deem advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each military area hereinabove authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal agencies, with authority to accept assistance of State and local agencies.

I hereby further authorize and direct all executive departments, independent establishments, and other Federal agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said military commanders in carrying out this Executive order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities, and services.

This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority heretofore granted under Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941, nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with respect to the investigation of alleged acts of sabotage or the duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice under the proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and responsibility is superseded by the designation of military areas hereunder.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

THE WHITE HOUSE, February 19, 1942.

On February 23, following the San Francisco hearings, this committee had become convinced of the need for the establishment of a custodian for the property of evacuees, a recommendation made earlier by certain members of the California delegation. It thereupon dispatched the following telegram to Speaker Rayburn, with copies to the President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of War:

We urge the immediate establishment of a regional alien-property custodian office for the Pacific coast area. We have learned of numerous sacrifice sales by

aliens; this office should have existed before the evacuation of February 15. It must be functioning before additional prohibited areas are evacuated. Many witnesses before this committee have urged this action.

Citizens who may be evacuated will require similar protection for their property, and legislation may be needed to set up such custodianship.

It is our impression that the need for an alien property custodian on the coast is but one example of a general need for advance planning for the civilian problems which are accompanying the evacuation of aliens and will accompany any future evacuations. The Army, after designating strategic areas, needs the planned assistance of the civilian agencies of the Federal Government in handling the actual evacuation and in resettling the evacuees. The need for advance planning and coordination of all civilian agencies concerned with evacuation problems exists now.

On February 26, the chairman of this committee received the following reply from the Secretary of the Treasury:

Your telegram of February 23 has been carefully studied by this Department. We are in agreement that there is a general need for careful planning with respect to the resettlement of persons, both aliens and citizens, evacuated from strategic areas and that the problem is one in which the Federal Government should assume a major responsibility. While the Treasury Department stands ready to handle any problems within its proper sphere of operation, I am sure that you will agree that the problems involved in national defense migration are primarily social problems envisaging the uprooting of a large segment of populations from an area and the transplanting of this group in a new locality. The problem is very similar to that involved in the Dust Bowl migration or in the resettlement of families moved from submarginal land. As we see it, the same problem would be raised if the Army decided to clear a substantial area of all of its inhabitants in order to use the ground for maneuvers, munitions dump, or a firing range. In any such case, the inhabitants of the area on short notice would have to be resettled in new areas, find new employment, and liquidate at forced sale their immovable property. As we see it, vesting title in the United States Government of the property of the groups being resettled would only further complicate an already aggravated social problem. Moreover, as you pointed out in your telegram, the problems involved are not confined to aliens but undoubtedly will involve United States citizens as well. It is the view of the Treasury Department that the social problems involved in any such resettlement problem should be handled by one or more departments of the Federal Government handling similar social problems or, if need be, a new agency created for the purpose of dealing with the problems of national defense migration.

On March 9 the chairman of this committee received the following telegram from the Secretary of the Treasury:

The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco is working out a program to deal with the property of evacuees from the Pacific coast military areas substantially as outlined below.

Scope of the problem: The evacuation on short notice of tens of thousands of persons from military areas on the Pacific coast raises serious problems in connection with the liquidation of their property holdings and the protection of the property of such persons against fraud, forced sales, and unscrupulous creditors. Obviously, the emergency will cause financial loss to the group involved. However, the following program is intended to accord to this group reasonable protection of their property interests consistent with the war effort.

Legal authority: Since the program is one basically to assist the evacuee in the liquidation of his property, it is expected that in most instances the evacuee will voluntarily avail himself of the facilities afforded by this program. Governmental sanctions will be necessary to deal with creditors and others who seek unfair advantage of the evacuees. There is ample legal authority now vested in the military authorities and in the Treasury Department which can be delegated to such west coast agency to deal with this problem without necessity of obtaining further legislation or new Executive orders.

Administration of program: The nature and urgency of the situation, coupled with the large volume of transactions that will require prompt handling necessitates the program's being administered by an agency on the west coast cloaked with full authority to act without reference to Washington. The over-all control of all aspects of the evacuation must obviously rest in the military authorities.

Subject to this over-all control by the Army, the direct responsibility for the execution of the property aspects of the program should be placed in the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, which has branch offices in Los Angeles, Seattle, and Portland. The Federal Reserve bank will be in a position to obtain the cooperation of other Government agencies, and all well-known and experienced individuals and institutions in the various communities throughout the west coast area. The cooperation, together with the established integrity and ability, of the Federal Reserve bank, will enlist the confidence of all of the affected groups and discourage gouging by creditors or other self-seeking interests.

The Federal Reserve bank will also work in close liaison with the Federal Security Agency, the United States Department of Agriculture, and other Federal, State, and local public agencies that can be of assistance in dealing with the property during the course of its liquidation. These agencies will undoubtedly be called upon by the military authorities to handle other aspects of the evacuation problem, such as the transportation and resettlement of the evacuees, and their reemployment in new areas.

The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, which is the fiscal agent of the Treasury Department, will be clothed with ample authority to execute the program. The Treasury Department will lay down the broad principles and objectives of such program as well as the general procedure to be followed. The department will also furnish the San Francisco Bank by airplane with the requisite number of trained experts to assist in working out the details of the program in the field and to participate in its execution.

OUTLINE OF PROGRAM

A. Properly staffed offices under the direction of the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank will be opened at once in the local communities from which evacuees will be moved.

B. Announcement will be made throughout the area by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco that its representatives in these offices are prepared to assist evacuees with the problem of liquidating their property and protecting them against those seeking to take unfair advantage of their plight.

C. These representatives will assist in putting the evacuees in a position to obtain buyers, lessees, and other users of their property on fair terms. In cases where the evacuee is unable to select his own agent to dispose of his property, the Federal Reserve bank will be prepared to act as agent for the evacuee under a power of attorney or similar arrangement and take steps to liquidate the property on fair terms.

D. Evacuees threatened by creditors will be encouraged to come to the representatives of the Federal Reserve bank for advice and guidance. The Federal Reserve bank representatives will also discuss the matter with the creditor with the view to working out a fair settlement and limiting the remedies that may be pursued by the creditor who threatens unfair action. By and large the mere existence of this program of helping evacuees will eliminate or forestall most of the sharp practices that are now feared.

E. In some cases the property of the evacuee may be such that its real value can only be realized at a future time; e. g., Japanese novelties. In such cases the bank's representative will assist the evacuee in arranging for the storage of such property, if that is the wish of the evacuee.

F. On agricultural properties the bank's representative, with the assistance of representatives of the United States Department of Agriculture, will attempt to arrange for the leasing or sale of such property or if need be for the growing of the crops, with a view to preventing their loss through inattention.

G. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and its representative will be clothed with adequate authority to cope with problems arising on the basis of existing circumstances. The program will be flexible and at all times the bank will attempt to keep matters on voluntary basis, satisfactory to the evacuee. Where these efforts fail it may be necessary for the bank's representative to step in and take the property over for the purpose of obtaining a fair and reasonable liquidation.

It is expected that the setting up of this program and the accordance to the evacuees of facilities for the liquidation of their property should greatly expedite the departure on a voluntary basis of the evacuees from the military area.

This program is being put into effect at the request of the Secretary of War and will be carried out under the general direction of the local military authorities. Full authority has been delegated to the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco to carry out such a program.

I am asking John W. Pehle, assistant to the Secretary, who is in San Francisco for the purpose of helping the Federal Reserve bank to put this program into effect, to communicate with you and keep you advised as to the progress of the program.

By the time the committee had completed its hearings at San Francisco and Portland it had become apparent that whereas the great majority of the witnesses were in favor of immediate evacuation they had no definite proposals as to the relocation sites. There was a disposition to suggest that these people should be moved "beyond the Rockies." It seemed to this committee essential that the public representatives of those States west of the Mississippi and east of the Sierras and Cascades should be polled for an expression of opinion as to this resettlement of evacuees. Consequently, the telegram shown in appendix A, page 27, was sent to the Governors of 15 Western States. Replies to this telegram, received from 13 Governors, are published in the same appendix, pages 27 to 31, inclusive.

As the committee proceeded with its study of the evacuation problem it was strongly impressed with the need for a permanent, experienced, civilian coordinator. Sufficient testimony had also been received to indicate the desirability of local boards which could certify the loyalty of the great bulk of the Italian and German aliens, most of whom were over 60 years of age and parents of American citizens of good standing in the community. In many cases they had been delayed in securing citizenship by the excessive slowness of naturalization machinery in some west coast communities or by their inability to pass the literacy tests. Having these points in mind, the chairman of the committee dispatched the following telegram to President Roosevelt on February 28 and copies to Speaker Rayburn and other interested officials:

My understanding that evacuation order is imminent. Think it imperative that appointment of alien property custodian and also coordinator for enemy alien problems precede or at least coincide with announcement of order. Unnecessary to indicate to you that coordinator should be experienced administrator trained in handling community and family relationship problems, including welfare, health, resettlement. Coordinator's job will include reemployment and agricultural problems. Urge also that coordinator's office start at once making plans for creating boards similar to present enemy alien hearing boards or comparable local machinery for examining loyalty of Italian and German aliens and certification of status. Coordinator should keep local officials informed of developments and consult them as far as possible.

It is the committee's understanding that arrangements are being worked out for embodying these recommendations in a more permanent establishment now being developed for the coordinator's office.

On March 2, General De Witt, pursuant to the authority conferred on him by the President's Executive order of February 19, published public proclamation No. 1, which reads as follows:

PUBLIC PROCLAMATION No. 1

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY,
Presidio of San Francisco, California., March 2, 1942.

To: The people within the States of Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington, and the Public Generally:

WHEREAS, By virtue of orders issued by the War Department on December 11, 1941, that portion of the United States lying within the States of Washington,

Oregon, California, Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, and Arizona and the Territory of Alaska has been established as the Western Defense Command and designated as a Theatre of Operations under my command; and

WHEREAS, By Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, the President of the United States authorized and directed the Secretary of War and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any such designated commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion; and

WHEREAS, The Secretary of War on February 20, 1942, designated the undersigned as the Military Commander to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed by said Executive Order for that portion of the United States embraced in the Western Defense Command; and

WHEREAS, The Western Defense Command embraces the entire Pacific Coast of the United States which by its geographical location is particularly subject to attack, to attempted invasion by the armed forces of nations with which the United States is now at war, and, in connection therewith, is subject to espionage and acts of sabotage, thereby requiring the adoption of military measures necessary to establish safeguards against such enemy operations:

NOW THEREFORE, I, J. L. DE WITT, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the President of the United States and by the Secretary of War and my powers and prerogatives as Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, do hereby declare that:

1. The present situation requires as a matter of military necessity the establishment in the territory embraced by the Western Defense Command of Military Areas and Zones thereof as defined in Exhibit 1, hereto attached, and as generally shown on the map attached hereto and marked Exhibit 2.

2. Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2, as particularly described and generally shown hereinafter and in Exhibits 1 and 2 hereto, are hereby designated and established.

3. Within Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2 there are established Zone A-1, lying wholly within Military Area No. 1; Zones A-2 to A-99, inclusive, some of which are in Military Area No. 1, and the others in Military Area No. 2; and Zone B, comprising all that part of Military Area No. 1 not included within Zones A-1 to A-99, inclusive; all as more particularly described and defined and generally shown hereinafter and in Exhibits 1 and 2.

Military Area No. 2 comprises all that part of the States of Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona which is not included within Military Area No. 1, and is shown on the map (Exhibit 2) as an unshaded area.

4. Such persons or classes of persons as the situation may require will by subsequent proclamation be excluded from all of Military Area No. 1 and also from such of those zones herein described as Zones A-2 to A-99, inclusive, as are within Military Area No. 2.

Certain persons or classes of persons who are by subsequent proclamation excluded from the zones last above mentioned may be permitted, under certain regulations and restrictions to be hereafter prescribed, to enter upon or remain within Zone B.

The designation of Military Area No. 2 as such does not contemplate any prohibition or regulation or restriction except with respect to the zones established therein.

5. Any Japanese, German, or Italian alien, or any person of Japanese Ancestry now resident in Military Area No. 1 who changes his place of habitual residence is hereby required to obtain and execute a "Change of Residence Notice" at any United States Post Office within the States of Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona. Such notice must be executed at any such Post Office not more than five nor less than one day prior to any such change of residence. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to affect the existing regulations of the U. S. Attorney General which require aliens of enemy nationalities to obtain travel permits from U. S. Attorneys and to notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Commissioner of Immigration of any change in permanent address.

6. The designation of prohibited and restricted areas within the Western Defense Command by the Attorney General of the United States under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and the instructions, rules, and regulations prescribed by him with respect to such prohibited and restricted areas, are hereby adopted and continued in full force and effect.

The duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with respect to the investigation of alleged acts of espionage and sabotage are not altered by this proclamation.

J. L. DE WITT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

Following the publication of this order there remained a number of questions which the public and press wished to see clarified. The committee had asked the coordinator, Tom C. Clark, at the time of his San Francisco appearance on February 23, to hold himself in readiness to testify again in Los Angeles. An invitation was issued to Mr. Clark, and he appeared at the Los Angeles hearing on March 7. The committee conferred with the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy, in San Francisco on March 9.

On Sunday, March 15, General De Witt announced the organization of a war-time civilian-control administration to be known as the civilian affairs branch of the General Staff. It was reported that "the new unit will open new offices in all areas from which Axis enemies are to be removed and supervise the myriad problems attendant on the widespread evacuation."

Lt. Col. Karl R. Bendetsen of the War Department General Staff was assigned to head the new unit as assistant chief of staff responsible to General De Witt. His headquarters will be in San Francisco. The original press release announcing this development reported that:

Serving with Bendetsen will be Lt. Col. I. K. Evans, deputy assistant chief of staff of the civil-affairs branch; Capt. Albert H. Moffitt, Jr., executive office; Tom C. Clark, alien control coordinator, as chief of the civilian staff; and Wallace Howland as deputy chief.

Other appointments to the civil-affairs branch include:

Larry B. Hewes, regional director of the Farm Security Administration, in charge of conserving agricultural property.

Milton Eisenhower, coordinator of agencies for the Department of Agriculture, in charge of the war-relocation authority.

Ralph B. Thompson, regional director, Office of Emergency Management, head of the division of administrative services.

R. M. Neustadt, regional director Federal Security Agency, heading Army's Federal security department and matters of health and welfare.

Dr. C. L. Ledrick, chief statistician for research, Bureau of the Census, director of the statistical division.

OPERATIONS DIVISION

Lt. Col. Martin Hass, War Department General Staff, heading operations division.

R. L. Nicholson, regional Work Projects Administration director for 11 Western States, in charge of alien reception center division.

Lt. Col. William A. Boekel, office of provost marshal, Fourth Army, heading division of exceptions and licensing.

Public relations section under Lawrence M. Benedict.

Price control section, under W. R. Thomas, Jr., Office of Price Administration.

Press relations under Capt. Phillip J. Sinnott of Fourth Army.

The United States engineers will have charge of the construction and equipment section.

PROTECTION UNIT

As the Federal Reserve bank is in charge of property protection, John Lawlor, assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, will direct conservation of all property owned by the evacuees, including business, residential, and intangible assets.

On Monday, March 16, General De Witt announced the extension of the enemy alien control program 1,000 miles inland from the

Pacific coast which he designated as military areas in 4 more States, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah, and set apart 934 more prohibited zones. Evacuation orders were reserved for later proclamations.

On March 17, the House Committee on Military Affairs reported out H. R. 6758 which had been introduced by Mr. Costello on March 10. The bill as reported to the House reads:

A BILL To provide a penalty for violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining in, or leaving military areas or zones

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone which has been prescribed under the authority of an Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed \$5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for each offense.

In submitting the report Mr. Costello made the following remarks:

The necessity for this legislation arose from the fact that the safe conduct of the war requires the fullest possible protection against either espionage or sabotage to national defense material, national defense premises, and national defense utilities. In order to provide such protection it has been deemed advisable to remove certain aliens as well as citizens from areas in which war production is located and where military activities are being conducted. To make such removal effective, it is necessary to provide for penalties in the event of any violation of the orders or restrictions which may be established, as well as to enforce curfews, where they may be required. The passage of this legislation will not only provide for the protection of the military areas or zones, but also be a means for preserving the safety and security of the persons who are to be removed.

At the time of the presentation of this bill, the first movement of evacuees under General De Witt's evacuation order seemed imminent.

This committee is presenting the following preliminary report with the understanding that it intends to make a final report to Congress within the next 3 weeks, if possible. This preliminary report is intended to state the situation as we now see it pending the effects of the first movement of those affected by the order. As soon as possible after this pending evacuation, the committee proposes to make a more comprehensive report which will cover in detail the findings of the committee in its four west coast hearings and summarize and analyze its testimony. At the close of this preliminary report can be found our present conclusions as to the basic considerations which must govern the evacuation and resettlement of these groups. We have placed special emphasis in this preliminary report upon the evacuation of Japanese because the problems presented by their movement are most imminent according to the military authorities. The committee wishes to acknowledge at this time the full cooperation which it has received from Lt. Gen. J. L. De Witt and all other military and naval authorities with whom we have had contact, from other members of Congress, from public officials, Federal, State, and local, and from interested groups directly concerned with the problems raised by evacuation in each of the three west coast States.

STATISTICS ON JAPANESE

Of the 126,947 Japanese, citizens and aliens, living in the United States April 1, 1940, 117,364, or 92.5 percent live in the prohibited and restricted military zones proclaimed by General DeWitt.¹ The three west coast States, California, Washington, and Oregon contain 112,353 Japanese practically all of whom are located in zone 1 from which all Japanese have been ordered vacated. Measures announced to date therefore provide for the evacuation of approximately 88.5 percent of all Japanese in the country and restrictions on the movements of an additional 4 percent. Of those to be moved 71,000 are American citizens and 41,000 are aliens. As a result of restrictions, legal and otherwise, the Japanese have remained concentrated near the points of immigration where they were originally brought to provide a cheap agricultural labor supply. Sixteen counties, for example, on the west coast contain 93,200, or three-quarters of all the Japanese in the country. Specializing in the production of fresh vegetables requiring immediate access to markets they have remained close to the major west coast cities. One-third of all the Japanese in California, or almost one-quarter of all the Japanese in the United States, live in Los Angeles County. Multnomah County (Portland) contains one-half of all the Japanese living in Oregon, and King County (Seattle) two-thirds of all living in Washington. The largest single community is in Los Angeles which contains 23,321, of whom 14,595 are citizens. Next in order of total number of Japanese comes Seattle with 6,975; San Francisco with 5,280; Sacramento with 2,879; and New York City with 2,087. Of the other cities with over a thousand Japanese, four were in California: Oakland, Berkeley, Stockton, and Torrance; the fifth was Portland, Oreg. Seven other cities had over 500 Japanese; Tacoma, Wash., was the only one outside California. The 10 cities with over 1,000 Japanese contained 47,779, or 37.6 percent of the total group in the country. Approximately the same percentage were aliens in these 10 cities as for the country as a whole, 40.3 percent. Foreign-born outnumbered the native-born Japanese only in New York City, where approximately 70 percent were aliens.

As a result of the acts restricting immigration the high ratio of males to females among recent immigrant groups has remained. This is more marked in the alien group. In California 62 percent were males. The corresponding figures for Washington and Oregon were 65 percent and 60 percent, respectively. Selective immigration from the Territories and possessions has contributed to an excess of males among the citizen group also, though the disparity is not so great as among the aliens.

As a result of selective forces affecting their participation in industry and trade the Japanese are highly concentrated in a few industries. In California, almost 20,000, or 50 percent, of the gainfully occupied are engaged in agriculture. During the past year alien and American Japanese produced 42 percent of all truck crops grown in the State. Just a little under 20 percent of the gainfully employed are engaged

¹ California, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Idaho, and Montana.

in retail and wholesale trade, mainly in the distribution of vegetables and fruit, of whom about 6,000 are engaged in retail and 1,900 in wholesale trade. The United Citizens Federation (Japanese) estimated that the thousand Japanese retail stores in Los Angeles do 75 percent of the total retail fruit and vegetable business. Next in importance ranks domestic service in which 4,400 are engaged. Almost 2,400 are employed in the hotel and restaurant industry. The United Citizens Federation estimated that 80 percent of the Japanese-controlled restaurants and 75 percent of the Japanese-controlled hotels cater to white Americans.

In Washington, 30 percent of all gainfully employed Japanese were in agriculture as compared with 50 percent in California. In trade, retail and wholesale, an additional 20 percent were employed. Thirteen percent were employed in the hotel and restaurant industries. Approximately 5 percent were engaged in the laundry and cleaning industry, railroad express, and domestic service.

In Los Angeles 30 percent are engaged in wholesale and retail trade, 18 percent in agriculture, 11 percent in hotel and restaurant, 10 percent in domestic service.

San Francisco has the oldest Japanese community in the country, but its inhabitants have been severely limited in economic opportunity. Approximately 40 percent of the gainfully occupied are in domestic service, 18 percent in wholesale and retail trade, 10 percent in laundry and cleaning establishments, 7 percent in hotels and restaurants, and 5 percent in professional and related services.

EVACUATION POLICY

All witnesses before the committee were unanimous in the view that military considerations must be paramount in assessing the need for and the character of evacuation. These witnesses were equally opposed to cruel and arbitrary measures that would violate principles of equity and the constitutional guaranties afforded by our democratic government.

This committee does not deem its proper province to encompass a judgment on the military need for the present (and any subsequent) evacuation orders. In time of war the military authorities are obligated to take every necessary step and every precaution to assure the internal safety of the Nation. The need for these safeguards appears the more pressing when we consider that present-day warfare has developed the fifth-column technique in unprecedented fashion. It is naive to imagine that the enemy powers will not exploit these techniques to the full. The tragic events of Pearl Harbor have created in the public mind a consciousness, whatever the character of the evidence, that the dangers from internal enemies cannot be ignored.

Recognizing the duties and responsibilities of the military, this committee is also impressed with the fundamental fact that wartime does not automatically suspend the Constitution. Justice is still administered by the courts of our land and martial law has its justification only when these courts are removed by the practical exigencies of warfare. Cases of rebellion or invasion permit a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus under the Constitution, and perhaps it requires

no stretch of the imagination or of the law to place within the latter category the recent predatory incursions of enemy submarines and airplanes. But suspension of this writ does not abrogate the fifth and fourteenth amendments, which provide for due process and equal protection of the laws. Even aliens are guaranteed certain protection afforded by the Constitution.

The most complicating factor in the present situation is that two-thirds of the Japanese ordered to evacuate from designated military areas are citizens of the United States by virtue of their birth in this land. The Executive order of the President empowering the military to designate strategic areas and to prohibit or limit the presence of persons in such areas does not declare that a state of martial law exists in these areas. It is silent on the constitutional rights of citizens. It was frankly an expedient impelled by the critical situation on the west coast. Under our form of government, any questions raised as to the constitutional status of persons affected must ultimately be resolved by the courts.

Various arguments were adduced in testimony before the committee why the Japanese, both citizen and alien, should be evacuated from the west coast. Most commonly it was said that homogeneity of racial and cultural traits made it impossible to distinguish between the loyal and the disloyal. Law enforcement officials were particularly concerned lest enraged public sentiment and possibly mob action, occasioned by reverses in the Pacific war theater, would work injury to innocent and guilty alike. Protection for Japanese residents as well as for the whole Nation was said to require the immediate evacuation of all Japanese.

Witnesses also pointed out that evacuation of alien Japanese alone would disrupt family relationships and create numerous problems of dependency. Some professed a belief that the aliens (Issei), being elderly and adjusted to their status as perpetual noncitizens in our land, constituted less a menace than the American-born (Nisei) who resented discriminatory treatment at the hands of fellow Americans.

The economic importance of the Japanese to certain west coast areas and occupations was readily admitted. In agriculture for example the Japanese are expert vegetable growers and market gardeners. They have been a major source of fresh food supply for the large west coast cities and have given employment to large numbers of workers, both in rural areas and in urban produce markets. But however serious the disruption to the economic life of the region, it was generally agreed that these dislocations are not generically different from other economic repercussions of war, and that in any event the safety of the Nation is the prime and fundamental requisite.

There is one special aspect of the demand for evacuation which the committee discusses later in this preliminary report. At this point, however, we wish to observe that witnesses in each of our four hearings testified to the existence of groups and individuals who have been taking advantage of this situation to their own gain. The Japanese have, of course, accumulated considerable property, both real and personal. This cannot fail to be a temptation to certain unscrupulous persons and, as stated below, the committee has heard a number of witnesses testify that no adequate safeguards have existed for the property of Japanese awaiting evacuation. The committee has

therefore been prompt to recommend as an immediate and urgent necessity the appointment of Federal custodial officers for the protection of evacuated properties. This recommendation as well as others flows directly from the consideration that by Federal order these people and their children are being uprooted from established homes and occupations.

Witnesses before the committee who entered objections to the complete evacuation of the Japanese as a group held that this decision contained an invidious racial distinction. Moreover, thousands of American citizens were described as being treated on a par with, and in some cases worse than, technical enemy aliens. Recognition and maintenance of race distinctions were said to create unnecessary internal dissensions and play into the hands of the Axis Powers who wish to spread the ideology of a racial war. At the same time concentration of public sentiment and attention upon the Japanese as a group, it was pointed out, will give a freer hand to subversive and disloyal elements among the other alien populations whose physical and cultural characteristics permit readier participation in the general community.

Several witnesses indicated to the committee the importance of considering the effect upon the Japanese Government and the people of Japan of any policy taken by the American Government representatives or advocated by the American people toward the Japanese residents of the United States. They urge that we bear in mind the reciprocal treatment of American citizens, whether military or civilian, who are now held by the Japanese or who may be captured by them in the future. These witnesses also advanced the argument that such action as was taken here might be used for propaganda purposes by the Japanese in their attempt to reach the people of Asia. The committee notes these arguments while believing that there are other more immediately compelling considerations for employing a judicious attitude toward this whole matter.

A profound sense of certain injustices and constitutional doubts attending the evacuation of the Japanese cannot shake the committee in its belief that no alternative remains. The decision of the military, whatever the influence brought to bear by public demand, is a *prima facie* acknowledgment that threats of espionage and sabotage are real and present and not wholly preventable by the constituted authorities. We cannot doubt, and everyone is agreed, that the majority of Japanese citizens and aliens are loyal to this country. But the innocent ten in this time of war will perforce suffer for the guilty one. Every representative of the Japanese appearing before the committee pledged the willingness of citizens and aliens alike to faithfully obey the Government evacuation orders. We earnestly hope that every effort will be made by the Federal Government to protect the property and lives of these people, and to resettle them in normal and productive ways of living.

RESETTLEMENT: AMERICANIZATION OR DEPORTATION

Ultimately, there are two alternative national policies which may be followed with this large group of people, alien and citizen. One alternative is deportation; the other is Americanization. Observers

agreed that the process of Americanization has been going forward at an increasing rate since the first World War. Only one witness advocated the deportation of any Japanese. He favored voluntary evacuation for those who wished to return to Japan.³

The incarceration of the Japanese for the duration of the war can only end in wholesale deportation. The maintenance of all Japanese, alien and citizen, in enforced idleness will prove not only a costly waste of the taxpayers' money, but it automatically implies deportation, since we cannot expect this group to be loyal to our Government or sympathetic to our way of life thereafter.

Likewise, the use of these people under armed guard for agricultural gang labor leads ultimately to deportation. The danger of vigilantism will be ever present. The effect upon the spirit especially of those who are citizens cannot fail to be injurious. The legality of such a procedure is of course highly questionable. The social and economic consequences of enforced labor, which competes with those who seek their livelihood in these callings, will be the recreating of many of the past labor ills from which we are just recovering. Any subsequent agricultural depression will lead to an outcry for Japanese deportation similar to that which led to the repatriation of thousands of Mexicans in the early thirties.

Serious constitutional questions are raised by the forced detention of citizens against whom no individual charges are lodged. Such detention must lead logically to an attempt to withdraw citizenship and ultimately to deportation of all members of the group. If the Nation believes as the committee does that we must live with these people as loyal citizens when the war is over, then every consideration should be given to the question: What is to become of these people after they enter the reception center? As the date for the first large-scale, long-distance moves draws near, this question increasingly demands a satisfactory answer.

The Americanization of Japanese presents problems parallel to those involved in the Americanizing of any well-integrated group of alien immigrants having the common customs peculiar to the homeland. The difficulties of this process are accentuated by their low economic status on arrival in the new country. In the case of the Japanese, a racial barrier militated against physical assimilation and marked them as a group apart.

Nevertheless, the process of Americanization and acceptance within the American community has gone forward, especially among the native-born children of the aliens permanently excluded from citizenship. Today, two-thirds of all Japanese are citizens. However, these citizens may be divided into those who have received part or all of their education in Japan (Kibei) who number 10,000, and those who have never returned to Japan (Nisei) numbering 60,000. Some Kibei were said by witnesses to have been turned against the Japanese Government by their visits there, but the committee heard considerable testimony that among the Kibei are the most dangerous elements in the Japanese community.

³ It was his contention that he was the authorized spokesman of a sizeable group of aliens in Los Angeles, but when he was requested by the committee to supply (publicly or privately) the names of their leadership he refused, saying they feared reprisals.

The Americanization of the Japanese, like that of other immigrant groups, increases with the length of residence and the loss of contact with the homeland. The Japanese are comparatively recent comers. The first generation of citizens is just coming to maturity. For the most part these citizens have not yet succeeded to the economic headship of the household, which is still controlled by alien parents. With the war breaking up commercial and cultural relations with Japan, evacuation may push the younger citizen generation forward if the opportunity to prove its loyalty and develop its capabilities is provided by an adequate resettlement program.

Two barriers to Americanization of the Japanese have long existed: First, the Exclusion Act by which the alien parents were denied citizenship; and second, the dual citizenship of Japanese born in the United States or its Territories and possessions. The former barrier has thrown the alien back upon the Japanese Government, through the operations of the consulates. This relationship has been reinforced by the presence on the west coast of large numbers of mercantile establishments and banks tying the commercial groups in the Japanese-American community to Japan. This in turn has led to the practice of sending children to Japan to be educated in preparation for trade and banking. Thus, the leadership of the business community has fallen to those in close touch with the homeland and to their children whose education and commercial position has directed them toward the maintenance of dual citizenship. Communities of Japanese farmers have been more free of these influences, but the need to secure financing of their crops has combined with strong peasant ties of language and kinship to keep these rural people in touch with Japan. The successful operation of the evacuation reception centers as a means toward Americanizing the Japanese depends upon a thorough understanding of these lines of force in the Japanese-American community.

With the outbreak of war, trading with Japan has ceased, overseas banks have been taken over by the alien property custodian, remittances to families in Japan are cut off. Evacuation may accelerate the removal of the narrow limits of the Japanese mercantile community. It may throw up new leadership among the Japanese-Americans and place a premium upon professional training or manual skills.

But at present there is no assurance that plans for resettling the evacuated Japanese in self-contained communities will lead to Americanization. To date the committee has been unable to secure from anyone charged with responsibility a clear-cut statement of the status of the Japanese evacuees, alien or citizen, after they pass through the reception center.

To date the committee has encountered a general disposition to treat the Japanese, whether citizen or alien, as a group, and to subject even the citizens to a scrutiny not applied to the alien German and Italian. The evacuation order of General DeWitt, for example, places greater restrictions upon the residence of Japanese citizens than upon German and Italian aliens. It is not clear whether this means that plans exist, either in the Army or in the civilian agencies now assisting the Army, for the segregation of all Japanese for the duration of the war.

Preferably, the loyalty and dependability of all Japanese, alien and citizen alike, would be examined at the reception center. This would be followed by arrangements for job placement outside of the prohibited areas of all persons certified. However, if large numbers of these Japanese evacuees become wards of the Federal Government, adequate plan must be made for resettlement communities. An important element in the planning of resettlement will be the occupational census of evacuees. Only one-fourth of the total Japanese evacuees are agriculturalists. Of the remainder, many are proprietors of hotels, lodging houses and mercantile establishments, large and small, or clerks and employees of such family firms. Resettlement communities will require a diversification of tasks and a development of new skills by retraining. Industrial or handicraft shops should be considered in plans for such communities. In order that they do not become potential sweatshops every effort should be made to emphasize skilled craftsmanship or the use of small multipurpose power-driven machines.

It seems probable that many of the agricultural groups will not return to the west coast. Already efforts are being made to prevent their return by the enactment of local ordinances denying them the right to lease or own land. Whether or not these efforts are successful it seems probable that quite a number of the agriculturists will develop land in the new resettlement areas, provided they can find land suitable for their intensive type of agriculture, which they will be reluctant to leave when the opportunity to return to normal civilian life is presented to them. In addition to plans for maximizing the output of these resettlement communities toward the food-for-victory and war-production programs, these communities should be used as experiment stations in agriculture, and for the development of new handicraft and machine-made products.

To insure a maximum of traffic between these communities and the outside world, free access should be accorded to all religious organizations, as well as to public officials in agriculture and vocational education. Because of the importance which education plays in Americanization, every effort ought to be made to sustain the schooling of the children in these communities.

Little or no thought has been given to the welfare of evacuated children. These children should be fitted to assume a place in the average American community. Children of senior high school and college age should be given opportunity for study outside the Japanese community in preparation for their return to normal participation in the average American community when the war has ended. Because of local community resistance, this may be difficult for high-school students; it should prove feasible for those of college age.

To summarize: Plans for resettlement depend upon a determination to Americanize the Japanese-American community. The mere decision to resettle does not, however, insure Americanization. These communities will require the maximum in flexible management, in understanding, and in freedom compatible with the national security, if they are to produce families equipped to return to life in the average American community after the war.

Those public officials charged with resettlement will encounter serious difficulties in their search for satisfactory land, water for drinking and irrigation purposes, climate, means of transportation, communication, and power supply. The availability of such facilities will vary, of course, with the size of the community to be created. And the size of the community will be determined in part by the response of the public and their representatives to the greater or smaller risks involved in proposals for certifying the loyalty and reliability of members of the Japanese community.

It is our intention to explore the problems of resettlement in greater detail in our final report.

PROPERTY CUSTODIANSHIP

Responsibility for the conservation of the property and property rights of evacuees must be squarely assumed by the Federal Government. Respect for this principle is dictated not only by standards of equity, but by ordinary business sense. The cost to the Federal Government for resettlement will be appreciably decreased if the assets of the evacuees can be transferred to the new location without loss.

In the absence of such a policy, gross abuse has occurred and many instances were brought to the attention of the committee. A typical practice was the following: Japanese would be visited by individuals representing themselves as F. B. I. agents and advised that an order of immediate evacuation was forthcoming. A few hours later a different set of individuals would call on the Japanese so forewarned and offer to buy up their household and other equipment. Under these conditions the Japanese would accept offers at a fraction of the worth of their possessions. Refrigerators were thus reported to have been sold for as low as \$5. It was upon the report of such abuses that the committee as its first act upon reaching the coast urged the immediate appointment of a property custodian.

The urgency of this step has already been recognized by empowering the Federal Reserve banks to assume certain responsibilities upon grant of the power of attorney by the evacuee, or by assuming the power to act on behalf of the evacuee without such authorization. This step may serve to prevent such abuses as have occurred, providing energetic steps are taken to advise the Japanese as to their rights. The committee, however, believes that the measure is only one of many steps needed. The committee wishes to stress the necessity for having ample local agents of the property custodian, empowered to act immediately to conserve the property, who can avoid as far as possible the red tape of securing approval from some far-distant point before they can act.

The mechanism to protect the property of the evacuees must be based on the recognition of two important factors: First, by far the largest assets of the Japanese are in the form of farm property, land, buildings, equipment, and above all, growing crops. One-quarter of all gainfully employed in California, for instance, are either farmers or farm managers. It would appear, therefore, that some agency in the

Department of Agriculture should be designated to work in cooperation with the Federal Reserve banks on property in agricultural enterprises. It was reported to the committee that some Japanese surrendered their leases before removing their buildings and irrigation equipment and thereby forfeited their right to them. To prevent such future occurrences all surrender of leases should be scrutinized by the property custodian to see that the rights of the lessee have been protected.

Secondly, nearly all schemes for resettlement envisage the resettlement of the evacuees on agricultural projects. As far as possible, sale of equipment and livestock should be deferred until final resettlement, at which time it will be possible to determine how much of this can be used on the new location. In this way, cost to the Federal Government of reestablishing such families can be kept to a minimum.

In the committee's estimation the connection between property disposal and resettlement reinforces the need for a director whose duties embrace all phases of the forthcoming evacuation. Provision should be made for the care of growing crops. In these cases the present owners and tenants should have the complete return, less the cost of additional care and harvesting. Lack of a plan to preserve their equity in growing crops has already resulted in a reduction of 80 percent in normal planting in Los Angeles County, according to evidence presented. It was estimated that in prohibited area No. 33 crop losses to date are \$250,000. Movable assets there are valued at \$250,000. On 733 acres in the thermal area the crop loss is estimated at \$237,000 out of a total value of \$323,000. Such losses in vital food production cannot be tolerated.

The responsibility of the Federal Government does not end with the provision of a formal custodian. There is the responsibility for protecting the full value of land and crops. Some system of valuation might be constituted to make up deficits. Consideration should be given to the appointment of valuation boards with representation granted to evacuees.

RECEPTION CENTERS

No sites for the resettlement of the Japanese evacuees have been announced as yet. However, a reception center has been located in Owens Valley, Calif. This will serve as a gathering point for evacuees. It is intended that reception centers will serve two functions: First, by classifying the evacuees it will be possible to organize more effective community resettlement projects; second, such centers can be used as temporary evacuation sites when certain areas are evacuated before plans for resettlement have been made. Under present plans, the Army controls the evacuee up to the reception center; at that point the civilian director with resettlement plans is supposed to assume control.

FEDERAL ASSISTANCE

The prime consideration governing the evacuation procedure is that most of the evacuees are loyal to this country; that they are being moved because of the Government's inability to separate those who are loyal from those who are not; that they are being moved in the

interests of national security; and they would not be moved if the Government were in a position to fulfill its obligation of discriminating between the innocent and the guilty.

Under such conditions it follows that the cost of transportation for the family, and its movable equipment, should be borne by the Government. From the time the evacuee leaves his home en route to a designated reception center or resettlement project he should be considered the ward of the Government, which shall be responsible for his health and safety. Families should be moved as units, and insofar as possible community groups should be preserved. In view of the problems of health, family organization, etc., it would appear that the actual evacuation should be under the direction of a permanent, experienced, civilian director.

NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN AND ITALIAN ALIENS

In the three west coast States there are a total of 57,878 Italian nationals distributed as follows: 52,008 in California, 3,910 in Washington, and 1,960 in Oregon. The largest community on the west coast is San Francisco, where there are 12,000. In nearby Oakland County there are 7,300. The third largest group is in Los Angeles, with 6,731. Over 36,000 are over 45 years of age. The overwhelming majority, 97.5 percent, are over 25 years of age. Of the 28,000 males in California 6,400 are in agriculture, of whom 3,700 are farm operators; 4,500 are skilled or semiskilled workers, 4,800 are laborers, and 7,600 are unemployed or without occupations.

There are approximately 22,000 German nationals on the west coast. Of these, approximately 17,000 are in California, 2,000 in Oregon, and 3,000 in Washington. More persons fall in the age group 55-64 than in any other 10-year interval. All but a few—9 percent—are over 25 years of age. The largest single occupational category is agriculture, in which almost 20 percent of the males are engaged. About a third are classified as no occupation or unemployed. Approximately 20 percent are skilled or semiskilled workers.

Two important differences are to be observed as between these national groups and the Japanese. First, these are not communities in the same sense as the Japanese. Generally speaking these groups are the remainder of a much larger group, who have become citizens. Literacy tests have been an important factor in preventing naturalization. The Germans and Italians do not have the original stratification of the immigrant group such as the Japanese which has been kept intact by legal and social restrictions.

The second important distinction is in the matter of occupational distribution. Whereas the Japanese have only one main economic base, vegetable production and distribution, the Americanization of second generation Italians and Germans has permitted the original immigrant group to become absorbed in a great variety of occupations and industries. The Italians on the west coast are heavily represented in agriculture and fishing, two industries which immigrant groups usually enter in large numbers.

The anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi refugees who came over in the last few years are distinct from the earlier group occupationally. They

are in the main intellectuals and professionals who are trying to adapt their skills to American conditions. They were a highly urbanized group in Europe and are trying to reestablish themselves in the larger cities in this country. The committee is informed that there are several thousand anti-Nazi refugees in the city of Los Angeles with perhaps 10,000 in all on the entire west coast.

EVACUATION OF ITALIAN AND GERMAN ALIENS

Evacuation orders affecting German and Italian aliens will be less stringent than in the case of the Japanese, according to present indications. No one has proposed that the millions of second generation Germans and Italians, born in this country, be treated differently from other American citizens. The military orders setting up prohibited area 1-A and restricted area 1-B on the west coast will require that German and Italian aliens be evacuated from area 1-A but, unlike the Japanese, will restrict but not prohibit their presence in area 1-B. Public statements by Mr. Tom C. Clark, civilian coordinator, at the time of the general evacuation order, indicate that such aliens over 70 years of age, as well as those with immediate relatives in the armed forces, will be exempt from the order.

Evacuation policies instituted for German and Italian aliens on the west coast have direct Nation-wide import because there are many thousands of these aliens in other parts of the country.

These aliens are elderly people, 50 to 60 years old, on the average. They have raised large families, and frequently one or more of their children are now in the armed services of the United States. Inability to read and write has hindered many of them from acquiring citizenship status. A typical case presented to the committee was an alien Italian widow living in Monterey. One of her sons was killed at Pearl Harbor; the following day a second son enlisted in the United States Navy. Without a policy of exemptions, the widow would have to abandon her home in Monterey, where she has lived for the past generation.

The committee does not doubt that fifth-column elements have in some measure found their way among the Germans and Italians as well as among the Japanese. We believe, however, that adequate protection against these elements among the Italians and Germans is consistent with a flexible policy providing exemptions in hardship cases.

To the aged and the infirm and those with sons in the armed forces, may be added to those many thousands of aliens who today are technically enemy aliens rather than citizens because of delays in the naturalization procedure.

West coast officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service appearing before the committee testified that the San Francisco office of the Service was 12 months behind in acting upon applications for citizenship. More than a thousand persons in that office still await final papers because there is lacking sufficient personnel to handle their cases. In Alameda County, Calif., naturalization cases are 32 or 33 months behind. The division of functions and of revenues between county and Federal offices has also prevented smooth

and rapid operation of the naturalization machinery. The costs of providing increased facilities will be far outweighed by the costs of evacuating these people as enemy aliens.

The tragic hardships and injustices of evacuation are most evident in the present plight of German and Italian anti-Axis refugees on the west coast. Many of these are in the process of becoming citizens, which process has been lengthened in the case of enemy aliens since the war. Although anxious to prove their loyalty and to join in the fight against the Axis, these people are being classed in the same status with the enemy they have fled. England has resolved this anomalous situation through special hearing boards created to grant exemptions from the enemy alien status upon individual examination. Persons so exempt carry certificates stamped: "Refugee from Nazi oppression."

To effect a flexible policy in the evacuation of German and Italian aliens the committee recommends that special civilian hearing boards be established by the Director of the War Resettlement Board. These hearing boards should include local citizens. They should examine all cases of German and Italian aliens on an individual basis, both before and after evacuation. Consideration should be given to the various factors that make evacuation an undue hardship and that demonstrate the allegiance of the aliens to their adopted land. Exempt persons should be properly certified. Decisions should of course be subject to approval by the military authorities and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Having in mind the fact that many evacuation cases could be eliminated by expediting naturalization procedure, the committee recommends that the personnel and facilities of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization be increased, and that persons in advanced stages of naturalization be granted a grace period for completion of their citizenship, upon certification by the local hearing boards.

For persons evacuated, an integrated public employment service and welfare program is essential. Special funds should be appropriated by the Federal Government and administered by those authorities which the Director of the War Resettlement Board has designated to assist evacuees in need. The facilities of the employment service should be geared to finding jobs and referring applicants after verification of employer demands.

No evidence was presented to the committee that Italian and German aliens constitute a major resettlement problem. Provided there is adequate Federal assistance and protection, it is not anticipated that there will be special hindrances to fitting them into new communities. To a much greater extent than the Japanese, they have become assimilated into the normal American ways of living. No proposals have been made to segregate German and Italian evacuees in special communities, nor has there been manifest any organized opposition to receiving these people in other areas.

SUMMARY

In general, the problem which we have surveyed during the last few weeks divides into two parts: the evacuation of Japanese, whether citizen or alien, and the evacuation of German and Italian aliens.

Each of these mass movements of people from certain prohibited areas on the west coast is assertedly made necessary by the military problem of defending the coast from attack. Never before in its history has this country undertaken such a moving of its residents. The evacuations of February 15 and 24 offer no real basis for comparison with the movement about to be carried out, since the numbers involved were relatively small, the move was made by individual families, and the distance to the new destination was short.

It is well, therefore, that the Army, with its equipment and organization for mass movement, should be charged with the new large-scale evacuation. It is encouraging to this committee that General De Witt proposes to postpone the movement of Germans and Italians until his organization has gained experience with the Japanese. It is equally encouraging that there is no intention to evacuate all Japanese on the same day, since a partial movement will provide experience for later evacuation of other areas.

The prevailing demand for speedy evacuation is the ruling factor in the decision to create reception centers. Ideally, the evacuees should be moved from their present location to their ultimate resettlement area. There seems to be a growing opinion that such resettlement will require a considerable period of time for the choice of sites, the taking of title, the construction of adequate community facilities of all kinds, and the determination of what groups shall comprise those new communities. Speedy evacuation must, therefore, be tied to the completion of adequate temporary shelters and facilities for accommodating all Japanese evacuees. Because of possible delays in later movement to resettlement areas, care must be taken to render the reception centers habitable for a considerable number of families for a period of weeks or even of some months.

Now that Presidential authority has been conferred on the military to carry out wholesale evacuation, and now that public opinion as voiced by the press and elected public officials has gone on record for the complete evacuation of all Japanese from designated military areas, the question of permitting any of this group to return to the prohibited zones for the duration of the war may be considered closed. The immediate problems are those of safeguarding their property, providing adequate facilities for transporting them to reception centers and caring for them in these temporary quarters, and developing a plan for their resettlement. Many of the essential details of the programs noted above remain to be worked out. Indeed, the committee's opinion is that most of the job involved still lies ahead. The machinery for temporary movement of these people is still being organized; the machinery for permanent resettlement has not yet been created.

If the Japanese evacuation creates serious questions, it is because an entire group out of our population is being bodily removed, family by family. This is in the nature of an exodus of a people. The numbers involved are large, but they are by no means as large, for the whole country, as those who will be involved if we generalize the current treatment of the Japanese to apply to all Axis aliens and their immediate families. Indeed, this committee is prepared to say that any such proposal is out of the question if we intend to win this war.

There are in the three Pacific Coast States about 85,000 German and Italian aliens, of an average age approaching 60 years old. Their average length of residence in this country is 24 years. Taken

together with such citizen members of their families as would need to move with them for family reasons, they might number 145,000. To move this group outside the prohibited areas will tax the facilities of public agencies even though these persons remain at liberty to move with a minimum of restriction outside the prohibited areas. To incarcerate these persons for the duration of the war would be a major undertaking, especially because of the age of the evacuees.

Taken against the background of the national problem implied, this becomes an even more unmanageable proposal. There are 300,000 German aliens in this country and 675,000 Italian aliens, or about a million combined total. Together with their immediate relatives who are citizens they are an army in themselves. It is doubtful whether our war effort could bear the consequences of shifting them all from their present residences to new settlements, even on a voluntary basis. Their incarceration for the duration of the war is unthinkable to this committee.

This is a Nation of alien peoples. Side by side with the unnaturalized Germans and Italians are 923,000 naturalized Germans and 929,000 naturalized Italians. Their children in turn number in the millions. By blood and by marriage they are related to these aliens and the aliens' citizen children as well as to millions of other citizens. There are approximately 7,000,000 persons in families of whom at least 1 parent was born in Germany or Italy. Surely some more workable method exists for determining the loyalty and reliability of these people than the uprooting of 50 trustworthy persons to remove 1 dangerous individual. Yet a generalization of the treatment now being proposed for German and Italian aliens on the Pacific coast leads only to this logical conclusion. Making special exceptions for those above the age of 70 or of those having children in the armed forces⁴ is no adequate substitute for a well-developed program for removing those individuals considered dangerous by competent Federal authorities, and of allowing all others to remain. If there are certain strategic areas which require special attention, we believe it best to evacuate everyone resident there and allow visitors only on permit.

The committee presents the following conclusions in the form of recommendations. It will be observed that several of these have already been made, in whole or in part, in communications made from the west coast to various responsible Federal officials. Recommendations made prior to our return were sent with such dispatch because we were of the opinion that a critical situation required immediate action. It is our opinion, as set forth in this preliminary report, that many of the preparations for operation of reception centers, and most of the plans for resettlement of the Japanese are still in the paper stage. The preparations as to evacuating of Germans and Italians are equally delayed. We believe that suggestions put forward in this preliminary report could expedite the development of such plans. We expect to report on the further progress of the program in our final report.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The committee is in full agreement with the President's Executive order of February 19, 1942. The designation of areas to be evacuated is a military matter to be decided by the Army. The

⁴General De Witt's exceptions.

committee commends the work of the Army, the Department of Justice, the Army and Navy Intelligence, Services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the evacuation problem.

2. The committee recommends that a single agency to be known as the "War Resettlement Board" be established under the Office for Emergency Management to coordinate and to determine all civilian activities connected with the evacuation and resettlement of enemy aliens.

3. This agency should be headed by a civilian experienced in welfare and resettlement problems.

4. This evacuation must be considered as a completely Federal problem. It has been ordered by the military and is carried out as a matter of military necessity. It is essential, therefore, that the Federal Government recognize its responsibility to care for these people in every necessary way. This includes the provision of immediate assistance, free transportation, medical care, and other burdens attendant upon forced evacuation.

5. Offices of an alien property custodian should be placed in every major center from which aliens are being evacuated. Arrangements should be made with agricultural agencies to handle the lands and crops of evacuees which are now under cultivation. The past experience of the Farm Security Administration qualifies it for this task.

6. A system of hearing boards should be constituted by the Director of the War Resettlement Board with representatives of local and Federal agencies, with the concurrence of the military authorities, to issue certificates for all Italian and German aliens whose loyalty can be established beyond reasonable doubt. Final decisions as to the return of these persons to areas declared prohibited should, of course, rest with the military. The emphasis of these boards should be toward the early return to civil life of all certified persons. Responsibility for recommending internment should remain as at present with existing enemy alien hearing boards, to whom the new boards would refer all doubtful cases.

7. Every effort should be made to resettle the evacuees in such a way that the process of Americanization can be expedited.

8. The committee recommends that the Department of Justice immediately review the situation regarding enemy aliens who are awaiting their second papers, with a view to expediting their applications.

Upon certification of the local hearing boards, a grace period for completion of their citizenship should be granted. It should be observed that all cases of enemy alien applicants are now investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation before citizenship can be granted.

The personnel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service should be immediately increased.

Numerous other matters having to do with the problem of operating reception centers, undertaking the relocation and resettlement of these evacuees, and operating of hearing boards to determine which Italian and German aliens can safely be trusted to reside within the prohibited areas will be taken up in the committee's final report to be published within the next 2 or 3 weeks.

APPENDIX A

The following telegram was sent by the committee to the Governors of the States inland from the Pacific Coast States.

FEBRUARY 26, 1942.

This congressional committee holding hearings concerning evacuation enemy aliens, west coast at request several Federal agencies including Army, Navy, Justice, Social Security Board. Many witnesses here urge sending all aliens, German and Italian origin, all Japanese whatever citizenship, to areas east of borders California, Oregon, and Washington. What is response of your State to this proposal? How many of these people could your State assimilate? What opportunity would there be for employing these people in useful work? Under what plan would you consider such movement feasible? What do you think is attitude of people of your State towards such a movement? Thanks for prompt reply, room 203, Henry Building, Seattle.

The following replies to the telegram addressed to the Governors of all the Western States¹ which might serve as evacuation areas for enemy aliens removed from the west coast region had been received as of the date this report was presented to Congress.²

PHOENIX, ARIZ., February 28.

JOHN H. TOLAN,
*Chairman, House Investigating Committee on
National Defense Migration,
Seattle, Wash.:*

The enemy alien problem is equally as serious in Arizona as it is in California, Oregon, or Washington. We have repeatedly demanded of Federal authorities that these aliens be evacuated from this State and the western defense command has listed 18 Arizona areas from which they are to be removed. We do not propose to be made a dumping ground for enemy aliens from any other State. We not only vigorously protest but will not permit the evacuation of Japanese, German, or Italian aliens to any point in Arizona. I cannot too strongly urge that such aliens be placed in concentration camps east of the Rocky Mountains. They should be removed entirely from the danger belt which comprises all of the States on the Pacific slope.

SIDNEY P. OSBORN, *Governor.*

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
Little Rock, February 27, 1942.

HON. JOHN H. TOLAN,
*Chairman, House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration,
Seattle, Wash.*

MY DEAR MR. TOLAN: This acknowledges receipt of your telegram of February 26, in regard to the evacuation of enemy aliens from the west coast area.

Our people are not familiar with customs or peculiarities of the Japanese. There will not be any way to employ these people in Arkansas. The only way I can visualize where we can use them at all would be to fence them in concentration camps under wire fence and guards.

¹ Arizona, Gov. Sidney P. Osborn; Arkansas, Gov. Homer M. Adkins; Colorado, Gov. Ralph L. Carr; Idaho, Gov. Chase A. Clark; Kansas, Gov. Payne H. Ratner; Missouri, Gov. Forrest C. Donnell; Montana, Gov. Sam C. Ford; Nebraska, Gov. Dwight Griswold; Nevada, Gov. E. P. Carville; New Mexico, Gov. John E. Miles; North Dakota, Gov. John Moses; Oklahoma, Gov. Leon C. Phillips; South Dakota, Gov. Harlan J. Bushfield; Texas, Gov. Coke Stevenson; and Wyoming, Gov. Nels H. Smith.

² March 19, 1942.

We are always anxious to cooperate in any way we can, but our people, being more than 95 percent native born, are in no manner familiar with their customs and ways and have never had any of them within our borders, and I doubt the wisdom of placing any in Arkansas.

Sincerely yours,

HOMER M. ADKINS.

BOISE, IDAHO, February 27.

JOHN H. TOLAN,
Seattle, Wash.:

Retel. 26. Be serious mistake to send enemy aliens to Idaho area on account of opportunity for sabotage of reservoirs along Snake and tributaries. If they were blown up would isolate western coast from eastern section. Farmers here are very bitter against employing this labor. I am fearful such labor would get hurt. My recommendation is that if enemy aliens brought to Idaho they be placed in concentration camps under military guard.

CHAS. A. CLARK,
Governor of Idaho.

TOPEKA, KANS., March 3.

JOHN H. TOLAN,
Chairman, House Investigating Committee on National Defense Migration,
Seattle, Wash.

Kansas, the very core of our "arsenal of democracy," with many vital defense plants and war industries, and with vast resources for more, must in all patriotism and considered judgment oppose proposals that enemy aliens be sent into this State for "assimilation" as suggested by witnesses before your committee.

By constantly stressing her advantages as a State with strategic military safety, infinite natural resources, great industrial capability, and an abundance of skilled, loyal labor and management, Kansas has climbed to an important place in the field of war production.

The infiltration of enemy aliens into our loyal Kansas communities would distinctly menace the security of our war industries, and would weaken the advantage our State offers to the Nation as an area with maximum safety against attack from abroad and sabotage from within.

Economically, the assimilation of enemy aliens into Kansas life is neither feasible nor possible. Opportunities for employing such people in jobs for which they are capable, and for which they could be trusted, are almost nonexistent. Clearly, if sent to this State, such enemy aliens would have to be cared for from public assistance rolls, which are already too overburdened to permit additions which would work hardships upon our own citizens. Safety operation requires that Federal Bureau of Investigation keep close surveillance over enemy aliens. Scattering them throughout the country will make an almost impossible burden on the already overburdened staff of that great organization, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

PAYNE RATNER, Governor of Kansas.

HELENA, MONT., February 28.

HON. JOHN H. TOLAN,
Chairman, House Committee Investigating Defense Migration,
Seattle, Wash.

From information received opinion here opposed to importation of enemy aliens into Montana to be used as agricultural workers.

SAM C. FORD, Governor of Montana.

LINCOLN, NEBR., March 2.

HON. JOHN H. TOLAN,
*Chairman, House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration,
 Seattle, Wash.*

Your telegram of February 26 relative to movement of aliens to Nebraska is difficult to answer as I do not understand just how it is planned to handle them. The people of Nebraska would not want these aliens released in this State, but it might be possible for them to be kept in camps under guard but where they might do some constructive work. Several flood-control and irrigation projects are under consideration in the Republican River Valley in southwestern Nebraska and another irrigation project is being constructed in northwestern Nebraska. You must remember that these aliens, if transported to the Middle West, will be among strangers who will distrust them and they will have to remain in custody of guards. Nebraska might use a few thousand on work projects as outlined but they should not be adjacent to important defense plants.

DWIGHT GRISWOLD, *Governor of Nebraska.*

CARSON CITY, NEV., February 27.

HON. JOHN H. TOLAN,
Chairman, House Committee, Seattle, Wash.

Retel February 26, think attitude people this State not opposed to sending all German, Italian, and Japanese aliens to areas east of California, Oregon, and Washington under proper supervision. Recent survey by me shows that great majority people would not employ enemy aliens, especially Japanese, because Nevada citizens would not work with them. Only plan I consider feasible this State would be Federal Government concentration camps and/or designated areas set aside for groups of them to work under proper supervision and guard at Federal Government expense. People here do not want enemy aliens coming into State promiscuously or being allowed to drift to all parts of State without proper surveillance and supervision.

E. P. CARVILLE.

SANTA FE, N. MEX., February 27.

JOHN H. TOLAN,
*Chairman, House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration,
 Seattle, Wash.*

Retel proposal to move enemy aliens and Japanese of whatever citizenship to areas east of California. We in New Mexico take the position that, as a border State, New Mexico may become a strategic area and we therefore oppose such migration to New Mexico. New Mexico could not assimilate any large group of labor. Since New Mexico does not have defense industries we still have a labor surplus. And except for seasonal harvest in small areas there would be little or no opportunity for employment. We concur in the desirability of moving enemy aliens from the coast area but feel such migration should be desired to place them in inland areas completely away from all strategic defense industry, and outside of areas that are now or may later be considered strategic areas.

C. R. QUINTANA, *Acting Governor.*

BISMARCK, N. DAK., March 4.

HON. JOHN H. TOLAN,
*Chairman, House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration,
 Seattle, Wash.*

Reply telegram 26th delayed owing absence from State. North Dakota will cooperate to the extent of our ability with the Federal Government in every manner possible. Our State now has some 1,700 enemy aliens interned at Fort Lincoln, Bismarck. Our State cannot assimilate any of these people. It may be possible to afford opportunity for employment but only during harvest season. No employment available any other time. Further consideration will be given your telegram as promptly as possible.

JOHN MOSES, *Governor.*

OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLA., *February 27.*

JOHN H. TOLAN,
Seattle, Wash.

Relative your wire February 26, our people believe should be brought inland and put in concentration camps. Would not be inclined to use them in competition with our own labor.

LEON C. PHILLIPS, *Governor.*

PIERRE, S. DAK., *February 27.*

Hon. JOHN M. TOLAN,
*Chairman, House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration,
Seattle, Wash.*

The people of South Dakota do not want evacuated enemy aliens within our borders. None of them will be assimilated in useful work.

HARLAN J. BUSHFIELD, *Governor.*

CHEYENNE, WYO., *February 27.*

JOHN H. TOLAN,
*Chairman, House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration,
Seattle, Wash.*

Reurtel, February 27. On February 21 I wired Attorney Biddle and the War Department as follows:

"There is evidence that plans are being made to move west coast Japanese into our State. No official information of any kind relative to this move has been furnished this office and in fairness to the citizens of Wyoming we should be fully advised of the details of any such plan.

"The State of Wyoming while willing to render every assistance in our war program cannot acquiesce to the importation of these Japanese into our State.

"In the event the War Department proceeds to evacuate the Japanese from the west coast into Wyoming it will be imperative that they be kept under strict Federal control, supervision, and Federal maintenance.

"If these evacuees are brought into Wyoming in accordance with War Department plans Wyoming citizens fully expect that the proper Federal authorities will remove them from our State upon the termination of the emergency."

Since sending this wire I have received many responses from Wyoming citizens indicating that they are unanimous in their support of the position taken in the wire. It is my considered opinion that it would be most unwise to send aliens into Wyoming without making proper Federal provisions for controlling and maintaining them.

We cannot agree to accepting these aliens on the basis that the State supervise, maintain, assimilate, and provide them with employment. The citizens of our State are unalterably opposed to such a plan but will if necessary accept them provided they are kept under Federal control and maintenance and provided further that they will all be removed after the war.

NELS H. SMITH, *Governor of Wyoming.*

APPENDIX B

FEBRUARY 25, 1942.

HON. JOHN H. TOLAN,
*Chairman, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration,
San Francisco, Calif.:*

Am informed your committee is investigating fifth-column activities as pertinent to west coast evacuation problem and hope committee can extend hearings to include Hawaii. In justice to reputation of Hawaii and to loyal citizens my community press stories and other statements often from irresponsible sources regarding fifth-column activities there should be substantiated from authoritative sources or definitely refuted. If committee not able proceed Honolulu for hearings in person may I urge committee ask for statements regarding current stories of alleged specific instances of such activities from Federal and Territorial officials such as Governor Poindexter, Lieutenant General Emmons, commanding general and military governor, Col. Kendall J. Fielder, head of Military Intelligence, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Captain Mayfield in charge of Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation Branch Director Shivers, Mayor Petrie, Police Chief Gabrielson, Maj. Gen. Briant H. Wells, United States Army, retired; Roy A. Vitousek, Chairman, Citizens Council, Leslie A. Hicks, president, Chamber of Commerce, newspaper publishers and editors and other qualified spokesmen for local community.

DELEGATE SAM KING.

MARCH 3, 1942.

HON. JOHN H. TOLAN,
*Chairman, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration,
San Francisco, Calif.:*

Reurtel appreciate prompt reply. Have phoned Honolulu and was informed community quite concerned at character testimony offered your committee purportedly describing conditions in Hawaii. Following your directions have wired for statements from responsible officers but believe such request should more properly emanate directly from committee itself. Honolulu citizens have asked me to urge you either hold hearings in Honolulu or if unable do so to designate Federal agency representing committee to accept sworn statements from officials and representative citizens. As Hawaii is under martial law and military governor is in charge believe military intelligence section of Hawaiian Department, United States Army, could act in this capacity or as alternatives local office of Federal Bureau of Investigation or United States district attorney at Honolulu. Important point is that such statements should be submitted to committee directly and made under oath to committee or Federal official authorized by committee to act for it. In matter of such vital importance to Hawaii believe committee would be justified in requiring sworn statements which will have more weight than those solicited by me.

DELEGATE KING.

HONOLULU, March 14, 1942.

HON. JOHN TOLAN,
*Chairman, Committee Investigating National Defense Migration,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.:*

Pursuant request Delegate King advise you there were no acts of sabotage committed in city and county of Honolulu December 7 nor have there been any acts of sabotage reported to police department since that date. Police department had charge of traffic on Pearl Harbor Road from Pearl Harbor to Honolulu shortly after bombing started with several officers on duty there. There was no deliberate blocking of the traffic during December 7 or following that date by unauthorized persons.

W. A. GABRIELSON,
Chief of Police, Honolulu.

APPENDIX C

On February 28, 1942, pursuant to an investigation of the problems connected with evacuations from military areas currently being undertaken by the committee, Congressman Tolan dispatched a telegram to President Roosevelt recommending the immediate appointment of an alien property custodian and a coordinator for enemy alien problems, and broadly defining their functions and duties. The full text of this telegram appears on page 8 of this report.

Reprinted below is the Executive order of the President, issued March 18, 1942, which follows the lines of the above-mentioned recommendation for a permanent coordinator.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ESTABLISHING THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY IN THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND DEFINING ITS FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to provide for the removal from designated areas of persons whose removal is necessary in the interests of national security, it is ordered as follows:

1. There is established in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President the War Relocation Authority, at the head of which shall be a Director appointed by and responsible to the President.

2. The Director of the War Relocation Authority is authorized and directed to formulate and effectuate a program for the removal, from the areas designated from time to time by the Secretary of War or appropriate military commander under the authority of Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942, of the persons or classes of persons designated under such Executive Order, and for their relocation, maintenance, and supervision.

3. In effectuating such program the Director shall have authority to—

(a) Accomplish all necessary evacuation not undertaken by the Secretary of War or appropriate military commander, provide for the relocation of such persons in appropriate places, provide for their needs in such manner as may be appropriate, and supervise their activities.

(b) Provide, insofar as feasible and desirable, for the employment of such persons at useful work in industry, commerce, agriculture, or public projects, prescribe the terms and conditions of such public employment, and safeguard the public interest in the private employment of such persons.

(c) Secure the cooperation, assistance, or services of any governmental agency.

(d) Prescribe regulations necessary or desirable to promote effective execution of such program, and, as a means of coordinating evacuation and relocation activities, consult with the Secretary of War with respect to regulations issued and measures taken by him.

(e) Make such delegations of authority as he may deem necessary.

(f) Employ necessary personnel, and make such expenditures, including the making of loans and grants and the purchase of real property, as may be necessary, within the limits of such funds as may be made available to the Authority.

4. The Director shall consult with the United States Employment Service and other agencies on employment and other problems incident to activities under this order.

5. The Director shall cooperate with the Alien Property Custodian appointed pursuant to Executive Order No. 9095 of March 11, 1942, in formulating policies to govern the custody, management, and disposal by the Alien Property Custodian of property belonging to foreign nationals removed under this order or under

Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942; and may assist all other persons removed under either of such Executive Orders in the management and disposal of their property.

6. Departments and agencies of the United States are directed to cooperate with and assist the Director in his activities hereunder. The Departments of War and Justice, under the direction of the Secretary of War and the Attorney General, respectively, shall insofar as consistent with the national interest provide such protective, police and investigational services as the Director shall find necessary in connection with activities under this order.

7. There is established within the War Relocation Authority the War Relocation Work Corps. The Director shall provide, by general regulations, for the enlistment in such Corps, for the duration of the present war, of persons removed under this order or under Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942, and shall prescribe the terms and conditions of the work to be performed by such Corps, and the compensation to be paid.

8. There is established within the War Relocation Authority a Liaison Committee on War Relocation, which shall consist of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Labor, the Federal Security Administrator, the Director of Civilian Defense, and the Alien Property Custodian, or their deputies, and such other persons or agencies as the Director may designate. The Liaison Committee shall meet at the call of the Director and shall assist him in his duties.

9. The Director shall keep the President informed with regard to the progress made in carrying out this order, and perform such related duties as the President may from time to time assign to him.

10. In order to avoid duplication of evacuation activities under this order and Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942, the Director shall not undertake any evacuation activities within military areas designated under said Executive Order No. 9066, without the prior approval of the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander.

11. This order does not limit the authority granted in Executive Order No. 8972 of December 12, 1941; Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942; Executive Order No. 9095 of March 11, 1942; Executive Proclamation No. 2525 of December 7, 1941; Executive Proclamation No. 2526 of December 8, 1941; Executive Proclamation No. 2527 of December 8, 1941; Executive Proclamation No. 2533 of December 29, 1941; or Executive Proclamation No. 2537 of January 14, 1942; nor does it limit the functions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE, *March 18, 1942.*

